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Abstract 
 
As democracy assistance of major donors, such as the EU and the US, has recently 
encountered fatigue due to the decrease of their credibility especially in the Middle 
East and North Africa, this study set out to examine the potential of a deeply under-
researched smaller post-communist donor, Slovakia, which officially extended its 
support to Tunisia in 2011. The research question investigated in this project was 
how Slovak non-governmental organisations (NGOs) can contribute to 
democratisation of Tunisia. 
Based on the data obtained through qualitative, semi-structured interviews with 
Slovak NGO, research and governmental representatives, this project argued that 
despite historical, political and cultural differences, the Slovak NGOs can contribute 
to Tunisia’s democratisation by sharing Slovakia’s very recent transformational 
experience, which provides the country with a comparative advantage within the 
donor community and increases its credibility not only as a donor but also as an 
international partner. The tumultuous Slovak transformation positioned its NGOs best 
to contribute to Tunisia’s democratisation in the field of civil society building, security 
sector reform and electoral support. The Slovak experience with both sides of 
democracy assistance, as a recipient and a donor, allows it to avoid mistakes for 
which major donors have been criticised, such as one-size-fits-all or institution-centric 
approaches. Even though, due to its desire to anchor its Western and European 
identity, it promotes the same liberal values as the major donors, what further 
distinguishes its democracy assistance is its emphasis on the process of 
democratisation, rather than endpoints and putting the needs of the recipients to the 
centre of their project design.  
However, if Slovakia wants to use its transformational experience as an added value 
of its democracy assistance, it should invest more into capacity-development 
domestically and reallocate finances from ineffective projects to allow the NGOs 
design long-term, and therefore more effective activities.  
 
Key words: Arab Spring, democratisation, democracy assistance, nongovernmental 
organisations, transformation, Tunisia, Slovakia.  
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Introduction	
 
The events of the Arab Spring have forever changed the face of the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) and created a new regional context for international democracy 
promoters. Having inflicted the revolutionary movements in the region, firstly 
triggered by a self-immolation of a vendor M. Bouazizi in protest of the harassment 
by municipal officials, Tunisia was one of the first countries to attract foreign 
democracy assistors. However, the transformation does not only pose challenges to 
Tunisia itself, but also to the global democracy promotion scene, which has been on 
a defensive for almost a decade. The well-known military interventions (Afghanistan 
in 2001 and Iraq in 2003), power interests, double standards, or economic problems 
of the major Western democracy promoters, such as the United States of America 
(USA) and the European Union (EU), resulted in their lack of stronger credibility in 
the region and therefore now may decrease their ability to advance democratic 
transitions (Burnell, 2011). Therefore, the democratisations of Arab spring may be a 
great opportunity to test the potential of the new generation of international 
democracy promoters produced by the EU integration of and after 2004, whose 
recent transformational experience gives them potential to contribute to Tunisia’s 
democratisation by offering a distinctive kind of democracy assistance.  
The project selects Slovakia and Tunisia as a donor and a recipient assuming that 
this may be the best testing ground because Slovakia, as the only post-communist 
country, officially extended its support to Tunisia within the intergovernmental 
initiative the Democratic Partnership Challenge of the Community of Democracies 
joining Netherlands in Task Force on Tunisia in July 2011. Having previously 
contributed to securing democratisation gains in similar environments of post-
communist space; now Slovakia faces a challenge of how to use its expertise in a 
very different context of the Arab world. Tunisia was the best choice for Slovak 
nongovernmental organisations’ (NGOs) engagement, as it is relatively stable and 
most developed compared to other MENA states undergoing democratisation. 
Tunisia also lacks experience with escalated religious or political radicalism, which 
gives it a positive prerequisite for development leading to a consolidation of 
democracy.   
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Due to the extensiveness of the issue of state’s democracy promotion and the limited 
scope of this project, the study dwells mainly on Slovak democracy assistance, which 
is carried out by NGOs, rather than that on the state level. However, as democracy 
assistance follows from official democracy promotion strategies, these will also be 
addressed briefly. Furthermore, the variousness and relative independence of NGOs 
best allow the study to shed light on the parallels and differences between 
democracy assistance of single donors.  
A large and growing body of literature has concentrated on the external factors in the 
democratisation process and the role played by an external assistor in country’s 
transition and consolidation. However, the vast majority of existing studies have 
focused on global actors, such as the USA or EU, while too little attention has been 
paid to smaller, recently emerged post-communist donors. Furthermore, there have 
only been a few studies, which compare major donors’ and smaller countries’ 
democracy support activities, but even those have only focused on democracy 
promotion, rather than democracy assistance on the nongovernmental level. 
Therefore, by researching the little-studied activities of Slovakia in Tunisia, this 
project contributes to previous studies of the role of foreign actors in the process of 
democratisation. Even more importantly, it is one of the few to shed light on activities 
of the new generation of donors, here represented by Slovakia, and on how their 
different experience and understanding translates into their democracy assistance in 
the field.  
Therefore, this study intends to determine whether Slovak democratisation 
experience reflects in its democracy support and so makes it distinctive from the 
democracy support practices of major donors, such as the EU and the US. Also, 
secondly, it explores the transferability or usability of the Slovak experience in a very 
different environment of Arab Tunisia. Expecting that donor’s experience with 
democracy at home reflects in their international democracy support strategies, the 
research question explored in this project is how Slovak non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) can contribute to democratisation of Tunisia.  
The overall structure of the study takes form of six chapters, including this 
introductory chapter. The first chapter will be concerned with methodology used for 
the research process. It will establish ontological subjectivism and epistemological 
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interpretivism as the research philosophies and then will move to introduce 
comparative politics as a research method, choosing qualitative approach in a form 
of semi-structured interviews, which will later be analysed by procedures of 
thematical analysis.   
The second chapter will offer a conceptual framework for the study by engaging with 
the key frontlines in the literature essential for understanding the researched issue. 
The first part of the literature review will focus on debates on democratisation. This is 
important because academic debates and current knowledge of democratisation 
processes influences the capability of democracy assistors to advance democratic 
development effectively. The section begins setting out a definition of democracy 
suitable for adoption by democracy assistors. Further, it will examine a democratic 
transition and consolidation in order to reflect on challenges of the regime change, 
which Tunisia is currently facing. After outlining the most important factors influencing 
democratic development, and emphasising the role of the external factor, it will seek 
to locate Slovakia and Tunisia, to a wave concept. This will later help the study to 
establish the differences and parallels between the two transformations, which 
democracy assistors need to consider in their activities. The second part will then 
focus on democracy assistance. Taking into account that it never exists in a vacuum, 
the section will, firstly, contextualise democracy assistance within broader democracy 
promotion. Then it will identify the dominant model of democracy being assisted, 
examining its advantages and disadvantages. Further, it outlines the most significant 
factors influencing donors’ democracy assistance design. Finally, it moves to 
introduce the main democracy assistors, while emphasising the extent to which 
smaller donors are under-researched.   
To determine how Slovak NGOs can contribute to democratisation in Tunisia by 
sharing Slovak transformational experience, the third chapter will follow Burnell’s 
(2011) finding that in their assistance, NGOs focus mainly on electoral support and 
civil society building and will highlight these themes within the Slovak 
democratisation. Consequently, it will also focus on Slovak experience as a donor, 
considering that the country could have accumulated democracy assistance know-
how learning from its own donors. The next section will examine the parallels and 
differences between the Slovak and Tunisian transformations, which may most 
impact the transferability of the Slovak ‘lessons learnt’. 
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The fourth chapter will concentrate on presenting findings and analysis of the 
collected qualitative data. In context of Petrova’s (2012a) two factors influencing 
donors’ democracy support strategies and based on the themes recurring in the 
interviews, the findings will be organised in sections focusing firstly on donor’s values 
and experience, and then on donor’s focus on the recipient. These sections will 
contain sub-chapters, which are based on the thematical analysis of the data.  This 
will help the study to determine how the Slovak NGOs can contribute to 
democratisation of Tunisia and establish to what extent the strategies used by them 
are divergent or convergent with those used by major Western donors.  
In the end, the final chapter will present conclusions and recommendations reached 
through examination and analysis of the collected data as stated in the previous 
chapter, while acknowledging limits and future opportunities for the study.   
However, comparing Slovak democracy assistance to the assistance of major 
Western donors, it has to be kept in mind that small Slovak organisations are being 
compared with big Western ones. Methodologically, it might have been better to 
compare Slovak NGOs to small organisations in the West but looking for such 
organisations, the author found it difficult to find such, with would deal with or focus 
on the studied issue. Therefore, this research compares small NGOs to big ones, but 
sees this difference as a consequence of insufficiency of funding on the Slovak side, 
which will be dealt with later, rather than insufficiency of experience or 
professionalism. Another problematic issue was that the research could not have 
assessed the efficiency of the Slovak activities in Tunisia, as at the time when the 
research was conducted, the projects were too young to be evaluated in terms of 
their effectiveness.  
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Methodology	
 
The research question explored in this study is how Slovak NGOs can contribute to 
democratisation of Tunisia. This chapter outlines the research process, while 
showing appreciation of different philosophical perspectives, major research 
implications, as well as advantages and disadvantages of the methodological 
choices. First of all, the chapter establishes ontological subjectivism and 
epistemological interpretivism as the research philosophies. Then it moves to 
introduce comparative politics as the most appropriate research method and chooses 
qualitative approach to the study. It further sets semi-structured interviews as 
the primary method of data collection, which are later analysed by procedures of 
thematical analysis. After establishing the secondary research as another data 
resource, the chapter explains how the study was conducted in keeping with ethical 
principles. Finally, it acknowledges the limitations of the research in terms of validity, 
reliability and generalisability.   
Research Philosophy 
 
Ontology 
 
Ontology is concerned with the nature of reality (Silverman, 2013). Therefore, its two 
main aspects are objectivism and subjectivism (Henn et al., 2008). Objectivism holds 
that reality is independent and external to social actors, while subjectivism 
understands it as a social phenomenon dependent on social actors and created 
through their actions and perceptions (ibid). In the context of democracy assistance, 
the social actors, such as donors (NGO workers) and recipients (local partners), may 
perceive situations in various ways, which may be influenced by their previous 
experience and reflect in their current and future actions. Therefore, in order to 
answer the research question, it is necessary to understand donors’ and recipients’ 
motivations and behaviour. Hence, despite the use of objectivist philosophical 
aspects, the research primarily relied on subjectivism. 
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Epistemology 
 
Epistemology is concerned with the nature of knowledge (Silverman, 2013). Henn et 
al. (2008) identify two main philosophical positions: positivism and interpretivism. 
According to Hughes and Sharrock (1997), the distinction between these two stances 
is the central debate in the philosophy of social research.   
Positivism holds that meaning “exists as such apart from the operation of any 
consciousness” (Crotty, 1998, pg. 8). It understands reality as objective, independent 
and external of social actors and therefore collects data about observable and 
measurable realities while ignoring issues like cultural relativism or power (Curtis and 
Curtis, 2011). As explained before, to answer the research question, it was essential 
to rely on subjectivist stance, and therefore the objectivist nature of positivism made 
it unsuitable for adoption. Moreover, this philosophy prefers quantitative data which 
would have not been sufficient in order to explore this under-researched issue and to 
obtain deeper understanding of emerging correlations.  
Interpretivism emerged as a reaction to the critique of positivism, which, according to 
Hughes (1990, pg. 90), “left no room for the idea that history and society were human 
creations and this constituted the essence of all social norms”. Interpretivism 
advocates the necessity of understanding people in their roles as social actors, as 
well as understanding meanings they attach to social phenomena. Therefore, 
methods used in natural sciences are insufficient for social sciences, since the latter 
seek to build understanding of people’s experience, perceptions, intentions and 
motives, which underpin their social behaviour (Henn et al., 2008). This position 
adopts qualitative methods, and allows developing a realistic and more thorough 
understanding of the studied issue based on a naturalist perspective (Silverman, 
2013). For these reasons, the adoption of this philosophy was highly appropriate 
because it allowed the exploration of donors’ experience as well as motivations for 
their behaviour, which was then put into comparison. However, the drawback of this 
stance is that it may be too subjective and too value bond due to its reliance on 
qualitative data (ibid). This project resolved the issues of subjectivity and credibility 
by focusing on interviewees’ professional rather than personal accounts, which was 
then followed by a double-check of the analysed data by the interviewed while also 
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comparing the obtained information with secondary resources, looking for possible 
contradictions.  
Research Method 
 
The very nature of this project, i.e. the interest in differences and similarities between 
the Slovak and Western democracy assistance in Tunisia as well as the assessment 
of the transferability of Slovak democratisation experience, predetermined using the 
method of comparative politics. 
Comparative politics is a field and a method of systematic empirical study of states’ 
political systems, institutions, behaviours and processes at international, national and 
local levels over time, attempting to establish empirical relationships between 
variables and draw conclusions from the comparisons (Lijphart, 1975).  
Utilising the comparative method provides this project with a number of advantages. 
Firstly, ‘it is concerned with both differences and similarities’ in a systematic way 
(Calvert, 2002, pg. 27). The study is then more structured, data are selected at the 
most appropriate level, a small study sample makes a complex reality of politics more 
manageable and the results more precise (Lijphart, 1975). Its scientific value rests in 
the fact that it allows much deeper insight than pure observation. Moving beyond 
sheer description it provides explanations and so helps develop understanding not 
only of the studied subjects, but political science as a whole (Blondel, 1995). Drawing 
conclusions from observations and behavioural analysis, it adheres to hypothetico-
deductive method (Calvert, 2002). An advantage of using comparative method for 
this project was that it allowed to research a phenomenon (Slovak democracy 
assistance to Tunisia) within its context (global democracy assistance to Tunisia), 
while shedding light on real-life contexts (expectations, motivations and needs of 
donors and recipients) (Silverman, 2013). 
Even though comparative method is the best choice to research the studied issue, 
this method has some drawbacks, which need to be considered and, if possible, 
overcome. Firstly, with 195 independent states in the world (USDP, 2013), there may 
be too few cases and too many variables (Lijphart, 1975). Lijphart (1975) therefore 
suggests that the number of variables should be decreased to achieve greater 
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effectiveness. Further, to be able to make valid conclusions, completely identical, 
radically different countries or countries too far back in time cannot be compared. For 
the method to be useful, it is necessary to find states with only small differences, 
which may sometimes be problematic. However, using this method leads to 
decreased generalisability of conclusions (ibid). Following this logic, the study 
compares the democracy assistance of Slovakia and Western democracies, which 
despite their different historical experience with political systems, are now based on 
the same principles of liberalism and Western values. In order to explore the 
transferability of Slovak experience to Tunisia, which would then provide Slovakia 
with the basis different from other states in that it will be able to offer ´lessons learnt´ 
from its own experience, it is also necessary to briefly reflect on differences and 
parallels between the two transformations.  
Research Approach 
 
After establishing the research philosophy and method of the study, it was essential 
to choose between quantitative and qualitative research approach, depending on 
which of the two would best allow developing in-depth understanding of donors’ 
behaviours and motivations.  
A quantitative design focuses on examination of relationships, which can be 
measured numerically and analysed in a statistical manner. An advantage of using 
this research design is that it can be replicated across the broader population and the 
results of data analysis can be generalised as they are usually representative of the 
wider population (Bryman, 2012). However, its structured and statistical nature would 
have not allowed gaining deeper understanding of how actors’ experience may 
reflect in their actions and what their motivations could be. Failing to establish 
people’s understanding of the world, which is essential for this research, it was 
considered unsuitable for adoption.  
A qualitative research, on the contrary, seeks to develop and deepen understanding 
of social actors’ meanings of the world through their viewpoints (Henn et al., 2009). 
Gathering large amounts of data in textual form from a smaller number or research 
participants, it concentrates on words, rather than statistics (Bryman, 2012); hence is 
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most associated with the philosophy of interpretivism adopted by this study. Unlike 
quantitative design, qualitative methods of data collection allow for greater flexibility 
and can be carried out in different stages of the research process, which can be 
therefore developed mid-way to address additionally emerging issues or drop those 
which lose their relevance throughout the process (Henn et al., 2009). However, 
being grounded on small samples, findings based on qualitative research can hardly 
be considered representative, therefore they are problematic to generalise (Bryman, 
2012). Also, its relatively unstructured nature results in data being less transparent 
and so the study is difficult to replicate (David and Sutton, 2011). However, despite 
the drawbacks, the qualitative research design was the most useful for the study, as 
its interpretative nature helped understand, describe and translate social actors’ 
(donors´) motivations and behaviours (democracy assistance strategies). 
Techniques and Procedures 
 
Primary Research  
 
Data Collection  
 
Due to the extent to which Slovak democracy assistance is under-researched, this 
project could not obtain sufficient information from secondary resources and a 
primary qualitative research had to be carried out. Silverman (2013) identifies 
interviews, observations, and review of documents as the most common techniques 
of qualitative data collection. However, observations were excluded on basis that 
even though they could provide interesting results, they were not feasible and, in 
their nature, not explanatory enough to provide a sufficient insight into the studied 
issue (Curtis and Curtis, 2011). Review of the documents was excluded as the 
materials were too difficult to access.  
Therefore, an interview was considered the most appropriate. An interview is defined 
as a conversation between two or more persons while an interviewer asks purposeful 
questions relevant to particular research aims, which an interviewee is willing to 
answer (Silverman, 2013). An advantage of this method is that it enables an 
interviewer to acquire clear and deeper understanding of the issue, as the flexibility 
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and the personal dimension of an interview allows them to gain more accurate and 
thorough data (Curtis and Curtis, 2011). However, this method may pose problems of 
reliability, credibility, validity and generalisability of the research. The interview may 
be hard to analyse and interpret, the conversation may slip to topics irrelevant for the 
research and, moreover, the interviewer cannot be sure if the interviewee is saying 
the truth. Furthermore, the interviewer themselves could cause bias by their non-
verbal behaviour, comments, personal stances or direction of the conversation 
(Silverman, 2013). To avoid these problems, the researcher carried out a cautious 
pre-interview preparation. To ensure the reliability and credibility, the analysed data 
were compared to each other as well as to accessible secondary sources in order to 
indicate possible discrepancies. Further, they were sent to all the interviewees in 
order to obtain their consent or suggestions for corrections. The issue of validity was 
addressed by using semi-structured interviews, which enabled the interviewer to 
further explore interviewees’ answers and probe their meanings (ibid). Even though 
some generalisations about the post-communist democracy assistance donors can 
be drawn from this research, the study focuses on exploration of the Slovak 
democracy assistance to Tunisia exclusively; therefore, the problem of broader 
generalisability of conclusions was not an issue.  
Silverman (2013) and Flick (2009) identify these types of interviews: focus groups, 
structured, semi-structured and unstructured interview. Even though focus groups 
may have offered interesting outcomes, this method could not have been used, 
because for the examination of the under-researched issue of Slovak democracy 
assistance it would not have been necessary to access NGO and governmental 
representatives, whose time schedule would have been too busy to synchronise. 
Structured interviews make use of questionnaires and so relate to quantitative 
research; hence, for the reasons explained above, they were inappropriate for this 
study. Unstructured interviews are informal without predetermined questions and 
usually focus on personal rather than professional accounts (Flick, 2009). This study 
therefore adopted semi-structured interviews, which, by having prepared a list of 
questions, help keep the conversation in the right direction while at the same time 
give a researcher scope to alter them depending on the development of the interview 
and provide the interviewee with an opportunity to talk more freely (Henn et al., 
2008).  
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Also, a sample of interviewees chosen for this research helps minimise the problems 
of reliability and credibility as the choice of the interviewees aimed to balance the 
views of different NGOs operating in Tunisia, adding academic and governmental 
views, and interpret the issue from a professional perspective. The interviews were 
conducted face-to-face or online and were recorded on a dictaphone.  
Data analysis 
 
Qualitative data can be evaluated using methods of discourse (Henn et al., 2009), 
content (Krippendorff, 2004), or thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006). 
Discourse analysis concentrates on how meanings of the social world are created 
through the use of language. Despite the fact that the focus of this method on the 
lingual structure and construction of the data could produce interesting results, due to 
its time-consuming nature, vague methodological suggestions (ibid) and relative 
redundancy in terms of the aim of this study, this method was not adopted. Content 
analysis focuses on producing replicable and valid data interpretation for the content 
of their use (Krippendorff, 2004). It helps code a text in a way that all cases with 
similar code can be compared and examined, while it helps to simplify extensive 
data. For this reason, some elements of this method were used in the study. 
However, Grbich (2007) points out that content analysis may focus too much on word 
count limits, which do not allow for a more comprehensive interpretation of the 
collected information and, moreover, it does not identify emerging themes. 
This research adopts thematic analysis method, as it helps condense the extensive 
data into main characteristics (Braun and Clarke, 2006). This analysis is used to 
spot, analyse and record themes within that data. A theme is defined as a pattern 
which describes and organises or explains features of the studied issue (Boyatzis, 
1998). In comparison to content analysis, it creates deeper-level topics rather than 
surfacing codes. It is also more systematic in identifying the emerging themes (Braun 
and Clarke, 2006). This study therefore drew themes from the collected qualitative 
data and analysed the recurring ones.  
Secondary Research 
 
Data Collection and Analysis 
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Curtis and Curtis (2011, pg. 218) identify secondary research as “…an approach that 
collects and analyses data sourced from the writings of social scientists...” accessed 
across physical and online databases. It differs from primary research as, even 
though it collects and analyses data, it does not create new ones but rather reuses 
the primary research of other studies (ibid). This project used secondary materials for 
purposes of the literature review and also to obtain information on Western 
democracy assistance. As there has been enough literature on democracy 
assistance strategies of the US and EU, primary research was not necessary to 
collect the data. The secondary data, as the primary data, were analysed using 
thematic analysis method and consequently compared with the primary data 
acquired through interviews. 
Ethics and Limitations of the Research 
 
Ethics 
 
Research ethics is a set of moral values and principles influencing the way in which a 
research is conducted (Silverman, 2013; Flick, 2009). For a research to be ethical, it 
should adhere to several principles. This project was therefore conducted in 
accordance with the principles of integrity and objectivity as stated in Saunders et al. 
(2012). The authors stress out that all social research should be truthful, accurate 
and open. The strengths and weaknesses of the methodology should be pointed out 
and analysis results should be presented honestly, irrespective of whether they 
confirm or contradict the expected outcomes. A very important aspect is trust 
between the researcher and participants based on respect for others and their rights. 
The research must ensure safety and avoidance of any harm, even in terms of stress 
and discomfort. All the participants must take part in the research voluntarily, based 
on acquisition of sufficient information in a way understandable to them while 
confidentiality and anonymity should be guaranteed and protected (ibid).  
The data collection was conducted on basis of permission from the School Research 
Ethics Panel (School of Human and Health Sciences, University of Huddersfield). 
Before the data collection, all the participants were provided with information sheets 
with details about the study in the Slovak language through email communication, or 
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had an opportunity to ask additional questions during the interviews. The information 
sheets informed the interviewees about their right to withdraw from the research at 
any point and were ensured that all their details and provided information would be 
safeguarded (guaranteed anonymity). As the interview questions were not of a 
personal or sensitive character, no safety or harm management was necessary. All 
the primary data collection for this research was based on obtaining voluntary 
informed consent from all the participants, who, after proof-reading the data analysis, 
sent their permissions to the researcher via email.    
Limitations  
 
The most common limitations related to qualitative research in terms of its subjective 
nature, are establishing validity and reliability, as explained above (Silverman, 2013). 
Reliability in this research was ensured by providing enough information about the 
research methodology so that it could be replicated or further examined.  
The content validity was established by adequate coverage of the researched issue. 
However, due to the scope of this study, the project was unable to address many 
additional emerging issues in greater depth. The construct validity was secured by 
providing evidence based on theories emerging from the literature review (Curtis and 
Curtis, 2011). To ensure internal validity, the data were collected accurately and 
consistently (Silverman, 2013). In terms of external validity this research could be 
transferred to other contexts, but due to its specific nature, its ability to be 
generalised is quite limited (ibid). 
To conclude, this project was based on subjectivist interpretivist philosophy since 
understanding reality as a social phenomenon was crucial in obtaining deeper 
understanding of social actors’ (donors’) past democratisation experience, as well as 
their motivations and perception, which all combined may impact their democracy 
assistance strategies. Comparative method of political science was used as a 
research method, the use of which emerged from the very nature of the hypothesis 
and was based on comparative politics ability to systematically assess both the 
differences and similarities between the studied subjects. Due to the extent to which 
the Slovak democracy assistance field is under-researched, it was necessary to 
obtain qualitative data through semi-structured interviews, which provide both the 
researcher and interviewee with flexibility to adapt to the flow of the conversation. 
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The secondary data was used for the purposes of literature review as well as data 
about Slovak democratisation and Western democracy assistors. This data was then 
compared against the conclusions of the primary analysis. Both sources of data were 
analysed in thematical manner, as this technique, by drawing themes out of the 
textual data, describes, organises and explains features of the studied issue. This 
project adhered to principles of ethical research conduction, and obtained informed 
consents from all the participants. As this project is based on qualitative approach, 
the problems of validity, reliability and generalisability arose and were addressed.  
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Literature	Review	
Introduction 
 
As democracy is a complex and living thing, the body of literature on democratisation 
and democracy assistance is very large and goes through many different aspects. 
The aim of this review is to offer a conceptual framework for the study by engaging 
with the key frontlines in the literature, which are essential to understand in order to 
research the studied issue. These debates are also important as the current 
knowledge of democratisation processes hugely impacts the capability of Slovak 
NGOs to assist democracy in Arab countries effectively.  
This literature review consists of two main parts. The first section concentrates on 
exploring issues of democratic transformation, as these are crucial for developing 
understanding of the process, which Tunisia is undergoing right now. Also, this 
understanding is essential for work of democracy assistors as it influences their 
approaches. Firstly, looking for most appropriate definition of democracy to be 
adopted by democracy promoters and assistors, the review recommends adherence 
to Dahl’s liberal understanding. After, it moves to define the two broad processes of 
democratisation, transition and consolidation and outlines the challenges, which 
transforming countries have to face. Thirdly, the review establishes the most 
influential conditions, which affect democratic development. This is important as 
there are a number of conditions, which have to be right for the Arab countries to be 
able to make any genuine transition or for Slovakia to be able to make any 
meaningful contribution to it. The review introduces external factors as an important 
condition and reflects upon issues concerning Arab capacities to democratise. 
Further, it classifies Slovakia and the Arab Spring within the wave concept. The 
classification enables the research to establish if the subjects of the case studies 
have enough in common to learn from each other.  
Although the literature presents democratisation in a variety of contexts, due to its 
nature this study primarily focuses on application of one condition: democracy 
assistance. After contextualising democracy assistance into democracy promotion 
strategies in order to set up a context for the activities of NGOs, the review identifies 
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liberal democracy as a dominant model being promoted and explores its advantages 
and disadvantages. Next section sets up donors’ domestic experience with 
democracy and recipients’ needs as main factors influencing donors’ democracy 
assistance approaches. Finally, it introduces the USA and EU as most influential 
global democracy supporters and point to their democracy assistance practices and 
their critiques, while emphasising the extent to which smaller donors are under-
researched.   
Definitions of democracy 
 
Despite its universal use, the term democracy lacks a uniform meaning, as it is highly 
politicised but it has also evolved historically, being constantly academically 
redefined (Markoff, 1996; Storm, 2008). The debate on definitions is important, 
because, as Pinkney (1993) states, the understanding of democracy directly impacts 
its quality in a country and therefore can be crucial in the transformational process. In 
the academic debates, Schumpeter’s (1956) and Dahl’s (1989) works feature most 
prominently.  
Schumpeter’s (1956) understands democracy as "that institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by 
means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (Schumpeter, 1956, pg. 269). 
His conception is rather procedural than normative (Beetham, 1994). Therefore, this 
understanding encourages a very formalistic approach to democracy in which 
procedural means become ends to itself. Without any additional elements, the 
procedural understanding could result in empowering a new regime of authoritarians 
or radicals disrespectful of civil liberties or the rule of law and result in the emergence 
of hybrid or façade democracies, such as Russia and Iran (Zakaria, 1997). Therefore, 
merely procedural definition is not sufficient for the embedment of democracy.  
However, Dahl (1989) builds on Schumpeter’s (1956) concept and complements it 
with other essential criteria for a realistic democracy, polyarchy, corresponding with 
the current understanding of liberal democracy (Doorenspleet and Kopecky, 2008). 
This study agrees that a regime is considered a (liberal) democracy only if the three 
requirements are met, namely meaningful competition, sufficiently inclusive suffrage, 
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and a high level of civil liberties (Dahl, 1989). Burnell (2011) explains that this 
definition encompasses elections and emphasises respect for human, civil and 
political rights, and therefore secures the rule of law.  
However, as the dimension of civil liberties may be independent of the other two 
(Diamond, 1996), this study considers a system meeting only the criteria of 
competition and inclusiveness an illiberal democracy (Doorenspleet, 2000). Since in 
such regimes there is a scope for civil and political right violations, this study sees the 
definition focusing only on the two requirements unsuitable for adoption by 
democracy assistors. A political system is considered nondemocratic if it fails to meet 
Dahl’s (1989) requirement of competition or inclusiveness (Doorenspleet, 2000). 
Defining democratisation 
 
The term ‘democratisation’ refers to “political changes moving in a democratic 
direction” (Potter et al., 1997, pg. 3). This study follows Huntington (1991), who uses 
the term to describe the overall process of political change, embracing both broad 
internal processes, ‘transition’ and ‘consolidation’.   
Democratic transition and consolidation 
 
A transition starts when an undemocratic regime begins to collapse or disintegrate. 
Then democratic structures are becoming routinised and the behaviours of political 
elites are starting to adjust to liberal democratic practices (Pridham and Lewis, 1996). 
Besides overthrowing an old regime, a country has to deal with tasks such as 
negotiation of the constitutional settlement and the procedures for political 
competition, demolishing authoritarian agencies and dissolving the laws not 
complying with democratic principles (ibid).  
During regime transitions, elites are the principal actors, who, for any democratic 
development, must be willing to adhere to democratic values, and also find 
cooperative partners on the other side of the table (Malone, 2011). Even 
nondemocratic elites whose power resides in hegemonic parties can be willing to 
democratise, if they see it as the only way of keeping at least a minimum power and 
therefore negotiate pacted transitions to democracy (Geddes, 2009). Contrarily, 
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dictators relying on concentration of power and cults of personality have no 
incentives for considering democratisation. Their position is much weaker if the 
impetus for change comes from below, from the society (e.g. Arab Spring); or if it is 
driven by reform-minded elites, who, displacing authoritarians, impose 
democratisation from above (Sodaro, 2004).  
The transition is completed when free and contested elections meeting Dahl’s (1989) 
institutional requirements have been held. However, this is by no means the only 
sufficient condition. Also, partisan alternation of office must be possible and effective 
control of civilians over the military must be established (Przeworski, 1992).  
Before speaking of consolidation, three minimal conditions need to be obtained; 
‘stateness’, a completion of the transition and the new government ruling 
democratically (Linz and Stepan, 1996). Consolidation is lengthier than transition, 
usually taking between ten and twenty years. During the process democratic rules 
and procedures are internalised and disseminated (ibid). Its principal objective is for 
transitional uncertainties to be gradually reduced to the point where a probability of 
failure of democratisation is extremely low (Pridham and Lewis, 1996). However, not 
all the countries that have gone through transition are able to sustain democracy 
throughout the consolidation process (Beetham, 1994; Grugel, 2002).  
For democracy to be consolidated, Linz and Stepan (1996) see the presence of 
these conditions inevitable: conditions for the development of a free and active civil 
society, relatively autonomous political society, a rule of law protecting individual 
freedoms and associational life, a state bureaucracy usable by the new democratic 
government and existence of an institutionalised economic society. In a consolidated 
democracy: Behaviourally, no social group is seriously and actively engaged in 
secession or a change of the regime. Attitudinally, the majority of the society accepts 
democracy as the best form of government. Constitutionally, all the major state 
organs and forces act in compliance with democratic principles and institutions. 
Democracy must become ‘only game in town’, when not only electoral winners, but 
also losers cannot imagine acting outside the democratic rules and instead of trying 
to destabilise the regime, they want to try again within the same system (ibid). Once 
a consolidation is well advanced, ‘new’ democracies are no longer regarded as ‘new’, 
but are referred to as ‘established’ (Pridham and Lewis, 1996). 
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Preconditions of democracy 
 
The emergence of democratisation is always attributable to several factors, which 
can vary throughout the process (Barro, 1999; Bellin, 2004; Huntington, 1991), 
depend on the nature of the old regime (Geddes, 2009) and can lead to or hinder 
democratic outcomes (Malone, 2011). Although due to the scope of the project it is 
not possible to talk about these conditions to a great extent, they must be mentioned, 
as each condition, if emerged, weakened or supported, may hamper or promote 
democratic development. The conditions can be broadly grouped into four 
interrelated categories – economic, social, cultural and external (Herb, 2005; 
Huntington, 1984; Gallagher, 2002; Malone, 2011). It is important to note that no 
single factor is sufficient for a democratic development, with an exception of a market 
economy, and the extent to which some of the preconditions are present could off-set 
the absence of others (Huntington, 1984).  
Economic development 
 
Lipset (1959) emphasises a positive correlation between democracy and economic 
development arguing that more developed and educated citizens are more likely to 
believe in democratic values. Also, a market economy is conductive to democracy as 
decision making is necessarily dispersed and power is shared and based on the 
public consent (ibid). Przeworski (1991) contradicts, claiming that democracies are 
likely to be established at any level of development. However, Doorenspleet (2004) 
points to the fact that Przeworski (1991) focuses on a period from 1950 till 1990 and 
therefore, instead of no relation, it is a demonstration that the correlation varies 
depending upon time and space (Geddes, 2009). Also, economic development could 
be conductive to democracy as it weakens nondemocratic regimes by both rapid 
growth and economic recession (Huntington, 1991).  
However, the MENA region countries were/are resistant to democratisation even 
though they were/are quite well-to-do. The problem has been widely analysed in 
terms of all four main preconditions for democracy but it is the economic factor that is 
generally believed to be the most explanatory (Diamond, 2010). ‘The rentier state 
theory’ shows that the problem is not the economic level, but the economic structure. 
In countries rich in natural resources such as oil, the need for taxation is reduced; 
hence there are fewer reasons for citizens to demand representation and 
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governments fail to develop the sense of accountability toward the citizens. The state 
is large, centralised, repressive, and corrupt; while the society is co-opted and weak 
(ibid).  
Society and social structure 
 
According to Huntington (1984), pluralism of the society enhances the probability of 
existence of a stable democracy. Widely differentiated social structure with relatively 
autonomous social classes, ethnic, regional, occupational or religious groups provide 
basis for the limitation and control of the state power. On the other hand, societies 
without these groups are more likely to be dominated by nondemocratic centralised 
regimes (ibid). Social capital theorists (Putnam et al., 1992) stress the importance of 
civil society participation as it fosters an atmosphere of trust, ‘norms of reciprocity, 
and the learning of organisational skills and social norms’ (Malone, 2011, pg. 75), 
which are all believed to promote democracy (Moore, 1966; Sodaro, 2004). 
Furthermore, Rustow (1970) argues that national unity is inevitable for a democratic 
development, as it determines who ‘the people’ are. Hence, polarising social 
divisions can undermine or slow down democratisation, of which precondition is 
compliance between a nation and a territory (ibid). For instance, post-communist 
countries’ transformations were complicated by the fact, that besides democratisation 
and marketisation, they also had to face the challenge of creating stateness, while 
resolving issues of nationhood. Therefore, this quadruple nature made the transitions 
slower and more difficult than in Latin America or Southern Europe (Kuzio, 2001).   
Most importantly, economic development promotes the expansion of the middle class 
(Huntington, 1991) which Lipset (1959) considers a natural advocate of democracy 
as relying upon its own economic base, the middle class works against the 
concentration of power by the upper class and seeks to protect its interests through 
accountable, responsive government and the rule of law. However, Rueschemeyer et 
al. (1992) highlight the role of lower classes in advocating associational autonomy 
and extensions of suffrage. Therefore, it can be concluded that “the position of any 
one class on democratisation cannot be considered in isolation from others; various 
class alliances can occur in different countries which can be more or less favourable 
to democratisation” (Potter et al., 1997, pg. 21).  
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Political culture 
 
As political systems reflect fundamental characteristics of their citizens (Malone, 
2011), in case of political transformations, the political culture also determines the 
type of regime that will replace the old one. Diamond (1999, pg. 163) defines political 
culture as “a people’s predominant beliefs, attitudes, values, ideals, sentiments, and 
evaluations about the political system of their country and the role of the self in that 
system”. For any genuine democratic development, there has to be a widespread 
support for democracy, at least a moderate amount of trust in political and non-
political institutions, government must be seen as legitimate and citizens must see 
some value in political participation (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008).  
The cultural factor, more specifically, the presence of Islam has often been used to 
explain the lack of democracy in the MENA region (Diamond, 1999). However, the 
argument is problematic as it assumes that Muslims identify themselves first and 
foremost religiously, and it neglects other identifications, such as those with ethnic 
groups or economic classes. Also, the fact that millions of Western Muslims live in 
accordance with democratic principles contradicts this claim (Ramadan, 2012). 
Further, Koran contains no statements as to what characterises Islamic government 
(Miller et al., 2012). Huntington (1984, pg. 208) sees as a problem that there exists 
“no distinction between…the spiritual and the secular”. However, this proves 
problematic regarding the well-established secular rule in Turkey (Miller et al., 2012). 
Moreover, Catholicism before 1970’s was considered antithetical to democracy, too 
(Diamond, 2010).  
To conclude, it is not Islam itself, but rather radicalism in any of its forms which is an 
obstacle for democracy and the ‘rentier theory’ proves much more useful in 
explaining the phenomenon of the ‘Arab gap’ (Sen, 1999).  
External environment 
 
Major global events, the international economy, actions of states or international 
organisations can either facilitate or thwart democratic development (Huntington, 
1991). As the external factor of democracy assistance is the main focus of this study, 
it is dealt in greater depth further in the literature review. However, it is here important 
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to shed light on external conditions, which have influenced democratisation 
processes of the case studies.  
In case of Czechoslovakia, Huntington (1991, pg. 86) sums up the influences which 
most pushed its democratic development forward: ‘Rome delegitimised authoritarian 
regimes; Brussels provided incentives for democratisation’ and, most importantly, 
‘Moscow removed the principal obstacle to democratisation’ when Gorbachev 
revoked the Brezhnev doctrine. After these changes, the Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) experienced the most dramatic ‘diffusion’ or ‘contagion’ effect, when 
“successful democratisation occurs in one country and this encourages 
democratisation on other countries” facing similar problems (Huntington, 1991, pg. 
100). The diffusion is the strongest among countries which are culturally similar and 
geographically proximate (Linz and Stepan, 1996). Czechoslovakia was one of the 
countries which were swept by the tide of democratisation in 1989, following the 
examples of Poland, Hungary and East Germany, and followed by Bulgaria and 
Romania (Huntington, 1991).  
Contrarily, the reasons behind the democratisations of the Arab Spring, namely 
Tunisia, were indigenous, as the economic grievances and social injustice led to 
mass civic protests (PDCS, 2012). However, Tunisian events inspired revolutions in 
other Arab countries (ibid); hence it can be talked about the diffusion effect.  
However, the international context played a very important role in the region already 
prior the revolutions. For years, the foreign aid was for non-oil regimes, such as 
Egypt or Morocco, a source of rents. They used it for survival as it gives them means 
to co-opt, repress or spent massively on public jobs without taxing much. According 
to Diamond (2010, pg. 101), external support for Arab regimes, coming mainly from 
the US and the EU, but today also from Russia and China, ‘confers on countries’ 
crucial economic resources, security assistance, and political legitimacy’. Ramadan 
(2012) argues that the presence of oil plays one of the key roles in determining 
countries’ attitudes to domestic events in the Arab states. Another influential factor in 
the region is the Arab states themselves as they reinforce each other in their 
authoritarianism. Also, the Arab-Israeli conflict is often used by the authoritarians to 
divert public’s attention away from domestic human rights violations and corruption. 
Still, generally, the West is not trusted in the Arab world, because of its double-
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standards, power interest, the use of force by the US to promote democracy and also 
due to these countries’ colonial history (Diamond, 2010). However, analysing the 
issue of geopolitical situation confronting Arab democracy is very complex and 
requires a more intensive study than is possible here.  
According to Diamond (2010, pg. 102), before the Arab Spring the problem was also 
“… a lack of even a single clear example of Arab democracy”. Now the question is 
whether any of the countries manages to consolidate so that it can be seen as a 
model. With regard to the recent development in the region, this study argues that 
such a role could be played by Tunisia. 
Having gained its independence from France in 1956, Tunisia was under autocratic 
rule of President Habib Bourguiba’s, then Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali’s for three decades, 
and was marked by serious human rights violations as well as severe suppressions 
of the civil society (Freedom House, 2013). The state was heavily centralised and the 
closest to resemble an otherwise non-existent democratic tradition in otherwise 
police state were regular elections, which, however, were manipulated by Ben Ali’s 
tight media and candidacy restrictions, resulting in him taking almost ninety percent 
of the votes (ibid). In January 2011, the citizens engaged in mass demonstrations 
calling for democracy. As a result, Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia and Tunisia embarked 
on the path of regime change, facing the challenges of the transition period, such as 
establishing democratic rule, reforming security sector, holding first democratic 
election, creating a new constitution, and building a functioning civil society (PDCS, 
2012).   
Waves of democracy  
 
Huntington (1991, pg. 15) defines a wave as “a group of transitions from 
nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and 
that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of 
time”.  
Internal factors, such as economic developments most influenced the first wave 
(1828 – 1926) while the first reversal (1922 – 1942) came as a reflection of the rise of 
fascist, communist and militaristic ideologies. External factors related to the World 
War II, when Allied occupation promoted inauguration of democratic institutions 
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engendered the second wave (1943 – 1962). The 1958 – 1975 militarisations at state 
levels again led to backsliding into authoritarianism. The third wave (1974 – left open 
until there is a reversal) was affected by both internal and external factors, such as 
declining legitimacy, economic development crises, performance dilemma, religious 
changes, and new policies of external actors. 
With slight variations, scholars generally agree with Huntington’s (1991) concept of 
the first two waves. However, the third wave’s inclusiveness of CEE created a focus 
of disputes in approaching the wave concept. Some scholars (Brown, 2000; 
Gallagher, 2002; McFaul, 2002) argue that characteristics of ex-communist states 
transitions were so different from the previous changes in the third wave, that they 
should be considered constituting the fourth one. McFaul (2002) claims that the CEE 
transitions significantly diverge from the assumptions of the third wave studies, 
concretely by the casual relationship between mode of transition and resultant 
regime types, elite consensus or compromise, and de-emphasis on the role of the 
radicals and the masses in the transition processes. Brown (2000) also notes that 
previous transformations of conservative authoritarian regimes were not a trigger for 
democratisation of the communist states and these changes in 1970-1980’s did not 
constitute a major reference group for citizenry and elites in CEE countries.  
Although McFaul’s (2002) and Brown’s (2000) approaches offer a valuable insight 
into the decommunisation, they do not provide basis for a break with Huntington’s 
(1991) third wave. Huntington (1991) himself stresses that regimes democratised in 
his third wave were a diverse lot and classifies them in his five patterns of regime 
change (cyclical, second-try, interrupted, direct, and decolonisation). For illustration, 
Czechoslovakia, with its multiple efforts to democratise, clearly belongs to the 
second-try pattern and therefore, qualifies for the third wave (ibid). The ex-communist 
countries also comply with Huntington’s (1991) five phases of transformation process 
(emergence of reformers, acquiring power, the failure of liberalisation, backward 
legitimacy, and co-opting opposition). Akhaine (2010, pg. 9) states that Huntington’s 
(1991) conception and analysis of the democratisation ‘does not foreclose divergent 
strains in the democratisation processes’. Rather, decommunisation, even though it 
was a dramatic one, only provides bases for “the expansion of the third wave spatio-
temporal delineation and thus constitutes a denouement rather than a new wave” 
(Akhaine, 2010, pg. 9).  
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The crucial thing is that for Huntington’s concept (1991), reversals have a key 
importance, as they allow defining waves clearly. They are called ‘waves’ because to 
really count, there must be a phase of recovery, reflux or failure. Otherwise they are 
not waves. Therefore, to use Huntington’s (1991) model of waves, reversals need to 
be considered as indicators.  
The difficulty of classifying democratisations after 1989 is that there was not clearly 
defined a reversal of the third wave and many scholars adopted the concept that 
waves can overlap (Popescu, 2012). However, the overlap concept does not provide 
bases for clear distinction of where one wave ends and another one begins. Without 
these limits, scholars use very different methodologies for classifying countries in 
waves. In the literature on Arab Spring there is an apparent confusion over its 
classification as in writings of some it still could constitute the third wave (Sarihan, 
2012; Tham, 2011), but in works of others it could be the fourth (Diamond, 2010), fifth 
(Engin, 2011) or even the sixth (Weyland, 2012). Although some disagreements in 
academic debates are inevitable and requisite in terms of research efficiency, such a 
big difference could make the study of democratisation disarranged. Therefore it may 
be better to either follow Huntington’s (1991) concept and look for reversals or, if 
there are none and the current democratisations do not fit Huntington’s (1991) third 
wave criteria, consider Doorenspleet’s (2000) theory of trendless fluctuations.  
Doorenspleet (2000) criticises Huntington (1991) for neglecting the requirement of 
inclusiveness and shows that focus on percentages of transitions can be misleading 
as they are also susceptible to changes in the number of world countries. In her 
analysis she shows that with the exception of the first wave, Huntington’s (1991) 
other waves cannot be distinguished clearly. Seeing no second reverse wave she 
concludes that there are flows but the ebbs are much less evident. Therefore she 
suggests that instead of waves, democracy should be understood in terms of 
“trendless fluctuations, in which there are waves of both authoritarianism and 
democracy” (Doorenspleet and Kopecky, 2008, pg. 702).    
However, due to the dominance of Huntington’s work in the field, to classify the Arab 
Spring in the wave scheme, the study will firstly try using his concept. Therefore, it is 
necessary to look if there could be found any reversals of the third wave or if the 
Arab transformations fit the third wave criteria.  
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Between 1991 and 1995 there was a relative decline in democracy as the percentage 
of the nondemocratic regimes increased from 22.9% to 27.7% (Diamond, 1996). 
Popescu (2012) argues that this is due new states establishments and the number of 
abandonments is too small to create an opposite wave. However, Gerrits (2010) 
highlights that emergence of hybrid and semi-authoritarian regimes should also be 
understood as democratic reversals. Observing mid-1990s authoritarian turn in 
Russia and events before the ‘coloured revolutions’ in Georgia, Ukraine and 
Kyrgyzstan he states that “different from earlier transitions from democracy, non-
democratic behaviour by democratically elected politicians is the dominant pattern of 
democratic regression” (Gerrits, 2010, pg. 34). Therefore, it can be concluded that 
there indeed was a reverse wave in 1990s. The difference is that façade 
democracies now make the distinction often less clear than it was at the earlier 
reversals (ibid).  
Sarihan (2012) attempts to determine if Arab Spring meets Huntington’s (1991) third 
wave criteria using his five phases of transformation process which resulted in a 
deadlock. However, the removal of Egyptian president Morsi is problematic in terms 
of phase of acquisition of power and, altogether with the above mentioned reversal, 
shifts the Arab democratisations on the side of the fourth wave.  
Also, fourth wave’s fragmentation away from CEE to focus on post-Soviet countries’ 
transformations, known as ‘coloured revolutions’, has been debated. Majority of them 
did not fully transition to democracy in the third wave but instead became ‘hybrid 
regimes’ with ‘patronal presidentialism’ inclining to autocracy (Hale, 2011). Despite 
the reversal of the third wave prior to these events, these transitions themselves 
cannot, according to Huntington’s (1991) concept, be considered constituting a new 
wave due to their small number (Akhaine, 2010). The Arab Spring is considered to 
differ again as some (Engin, 2011) liken it to transitions before 1989. Therefore, it 
would be worth considering if ‘coloured revolutions’ and Arab Spring could constitute 
one wave, maybe as diverse as Huntington’s (1991) third. However, because the 
Arab revolutions are so close in time, they can only be located in a wave after some 
time, when it is clear where the regime changes in the region actually lead.   
Democracy Promotion and Democracy Assistance 
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Democracy Promotion 
 
Democracy assistance, which is the centre of the focus of this study, never exists in a 
vacuum but, as a part of development aid packages, follows from country’s broader 
democracy promotion strategies. Numerous studies have attempted to provide a 
precise definition of democracy promotion but the term remains contested, reflecting 
the plurality of political and academic opinions (Malone, 2011). Burnell (2011, pg. 4) 
comprehensively describes democracy promotion as referring to  
“…a range of different strategies, forms and modalities directed at supporting movement towards 
(liberal) democracy: indirect approaches address democracy’s requisites, which can include economic 
and social requisites; more direct approaches, including democracy assistance, concentrate on 
political objects. Strategies range from soft to hard power and can include attaching democratic 
conditionalities to diplomatic and official trade and aid arrangements”.  
According to Burnell (2013), democracy promotion is a Western concept, which rise 
is deeply interconnected with the Cold War and fight against Communism, when 
Western powers started promoting dual transitions (Huntington, 1991). Generally, 
donors’ underlying motivations vary and are mostly impacted by their geopolitical 
interests or liabilities accruing from their memberships in international organisations. 
They can promote democracy for its own sake but the biggest democracy promoters’ 
(EU, US) selectivity rather demonstrates a more practical approach (Hobson, 2009).  
Burnell and Randall (2008) list three main approaches to democracy promotion: use 
of force, conditionalities and democracy assistance. The first approach has been 
largely discredited as a tool of spreading democratic values. The US invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq eroded support for democracy promotion and its credibility. 
Also, the recent leaning of the two countries to radicalism and authoritarian practices 
proved this method inefficient (Burnell, 2013).  Moreover, there exists no international 
legal right to promote democracy abroad (Burnell, 2011). Applying democratic 
conditionalities to receipt of development aid or trade concessions can improve 
democratic practices but faces problems when a determined authoritarian regime is 
in place. Burnell (2011) recommends reducing inconsistency in its use and linking it 
to more positive measures of engagement, such as the EU accession.  
Democracy assistance 
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Recently, donors have chosen to aid democracy in a gradual way, supporting a slow 
regime change through democracy assistance. Due to its prevalence, this study 
largely dwells on this method of promotion. Democracy assistance is “a particular 
way of promoting democracy through the provision of funding or technical assistance 
to governments, institutions or other actors in civil society working toward the 
establishment or strengthening of democracy in a certain country” (Malone, 2011; 
citing Azpuru et al., 2008). Burnell (2011) groups democracy assistance projects into 
the following sectors:  electoral support; constitutional reform; support for legislative 
strengthening; rule of law assistance; judicial autonomy; support for capacity-building 
in civil society and support for political party development. Women’s political 
empowerment cuts across the sectors (Burnell, 2011). 
Democracy assistance is combined with diplomatic strategies, depending on what is 
appropriate in the light of recipient’s political situation. Assistance is usually sufficient 
where a momentum for a change already exists and is supported by elites. However, 
when power-holders are determined to reverse the democratic development, other 
measures might be considered. Still, the democracy assistance programs prove the 
best at influencing the political culture so that it embraces democratic values (Burnell, 
2011; Carothers, 2009). It is the democracy assistance that usually runs behind 
events as the projects are reactive and more flexible in comparison to in advance 
detail-planned broader democracy promotion (Burnell, 2011).  
However, Carothers (2009) questions the usefulness of technical advice, financial 
support and trainings as they might be perceived as patronising. Therefore, to make 
a positive impact, projects and programmes need to be sensitive and put emphasis 
on establishment of local ownership, as highlighted in the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness (OECD, 2013). Overall, a better coordination between different donors’ 
projects is necessary (ibid). Anyway, the causal connections between democracy on 
one side and expenditures of money, time, advice and technical expertise on the 
other are still unknown. It is difficult to draw conclusions as there are not enough 
credible evaluations of democracy assistance as a whole (Burnell, 2011). The 
evaluation studies available mostly focus on the US democracy assistance. The most 
ambitious assessment by Finkel et al. (Malone, 2011; citing Finkel et al., 2009) over 
1990-2003 conclude that the assistance does have a positive effect on 
democratisation but less so in the field of human rights. Seligson et al. (Malone, 
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2011; citing Seligson et al., 2009) finds that states which received more democracy 
assistance from the US were likely to be more democratic. Even though these 
findings are encouraging, more research is needed.  
Besides multilateral assistance, which is usually provided through international global 
organisations such as the United Nations (UN) or EU, public democracy assistance 
can be channelled through governmental, intergovernmental and nongovernmental 
organisations. Different side actors also vary in their comparative advantage. NGOs 
cannot threaten economic sanctions or, unlike intergovernmental organisations, they 
cannot offer politically conditioned aid. But despite their limited financial resources, 
they can offer much practical experience, valuable technical expertise, or extra 
political options. This study focuses on the assistance provided by the NGOs due to 
their relative independence and variousness, which can best demonstrate a variety of 
approaches to supporting democracy (Burnell, 2011). According to Burnell (2011), 
the democracy assistance of Western donors, such as the EU and the US, is usually 
channelled through projects in form of trainings, public discussions, conferences, 
study visits in donors’ domestic institutions or publishing of relevant research or 
manuals.   
Liberal Democracy in Democracy Promotion 
 
The broad acceptance of liberal democracy during the third wave transformations 
has been taken as a sign of its global appeal and worldwide ideational dominance. Its 
strength has been underpinned by a geo-political environment favourable to 
established Western democracies and the role of the US as a superpower as well as 
a vanguard of the global democratic movement (Hobson, 2009).  
Hence, today, there is an apparent emphasis on this particular liberal model of 
democracy promotion, styled after the prevalent type of democracy in the West, 
empower mainly by American understanding (Hobson, 2009). This has been 
attracting increasing criticism as it is perceived by many as imperialistic and culturally 
biased. Indeed, there are legitimate questions about whether one understanding is 
suitable to all societies, especially relevant at the time of the Arab Spring, as these 
cultures significantly differ from the West (Zakaria, 1997).     
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Various forms of democracy resolve differently tensions between the principles of 
liberty and equality. If equality is prioritised, the Anglo-American model shows 
deficiencies. If liberty is considered supreme, liberalism is more useful (Hobson, 
2009). The social upheavals of Arab Spring demonstrated the demand for the 
protection of individual rights and freedoms, equality before the law and the need for 
the economic reform, all of which are upheld by the liberal model (Burnell, 2013). 
Therefore, illiberal models (e.g. Iran) would not be a solution. By its market-based 
development strategies liberalism not only provides poorer countries with the 
necessary infrastructure, but by addressing internal social injustice and political 
oppression eliminates conflicts, which provides a tool against terrorism (Diamond, 
2010).  
Without naivety, it must be admitted, that the liberal model indeed serves to promote 
Western values and interests. This, however, is nothing surprising in the world of 
politics. Hobson (2009) is right that there are many, maybe sometimes more suitable, 
models which could be promoted instead, such as Scandinavian social welfare 
version, participatory or deliberative models. Still, it seems that the variation between 
Western democracies, for instance the US and Scandinavia, is significantly reduced 
when promoting democracy elsewhere (ibid). However, this uniformity is practical in 
terms of consistency and effectiveness of the democracy assistance strategies. 
Usually, many donors operate within a single country. This multiplicity is important as 
it, to some extent, eliminates recipients’ suspicions that they may be occupied. 
Without the uniformity about what is being promoted, the promotion would become 
confusing for the recipients and therefore, ineffective. However, this uniformity is 
currently starting being challenged by the rising powers of Russia and China, which 
do not favour liberal democracy (Burnell, 2011). The uniformity was also criticised as 
attempting to homogenise the world. The justness of this is debatable but it can be 
understood in respect to the global security. Not only are politically similar states 
more likely to understand each other, but the liberal democratic values also create 
common norms about how to resolve conflicts and spread peace, stability and 
security (Carothers, 2009; Reynolds, 2011).  
There are many eloquent critiques that add value to the debate on democracy 
promotion but generally many of them tend to make assumptions which are 
rebuttable when looking closely at what democracy promoters do on the ground 
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(Youngs, 2011). The liberal model has been criticised for alleged reduction of 
democracy to holding of competitive, free and fair elections (for instance, the US 
engagement in Afghanistan). In fact, no democracy promoter claims that democracy 
equals elections (ibid). Rather, the problem is how much effort is invested into 
holding elections in comparison to other elements of a quality democracy. The extent 
of concentration on elections varies by countries but the evidence shows that the 
West, including the US, currently prioritises civil society projects, which reflects in the 
funding (Malone et al., 2011).  
It has already been shown that liberal democracy is not culturally imperialistic as it 
contains values relatively common for most world’s cultures and religions. It is 
therefore unjust to accuse democracy promoters of not allowing any room for 
religiously-based representations. They do not equate democracy with pure 
secularism of which an illustration may be a fulsome support for Lebanon’s 
confessional-based democracy (Youngs, 2011). It is true that the West does not do 
well engaging with Islamists but these shortcomings are not the result of liberal 
democracy’s incapacity to include religiosity (Burnell, 2013). Rather, what is 
perceived as imperialistic and self-interested is not a promotion of a particular model 
of democratic reform, but double-standards of donors, who sometimes support and 
sometimes differ democracy or delink their business agendas (ibid). 
Influences on Donor’s Democracy Assistance Approaches 
 
Single countries’ approaches to democracy assistance can diverge and converge. 
The way, in which donor NGOs carry out their activities are shaped, besides official 
democracy promotion policies, by their domestic values, institutions, and experience 
(Petrova, 2012a). Petrova (2012a, pg. 7) states that “…there are distinct national 
approaches to supporting democracy abroad that are based on the domestic models 
of democracy of each donor”. Youngs (2001) demonstrates this point by showing 
how the US’ approach and its aims have been changing with the development of the 
US democracy, while also EU’s approaches reflect countries’ core democratic 
values. Hence, donors’ approaches depend on their understanding of the successes 
and failures of democratisation or democracy at home, as well as their former 
accomplishments as donors (Petrova, 2012a). Further, states’ behaviours towards 
other countries are also influenced by their identity construction, which Jonavicius 
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(2008, pg. 2) explains as “how you are perceived by others is of a crucial importance 
for the general understanding of who you are”.  
Majority donors’ approaches focus on the institutions considered their domestic 
constituent elements of democracy. These are then set as desired endpoints and the 
assistors “…assess recipient countries in terms of how their major socio-political 
institutions compare to these endpoints. Aid programmes are designed to address 
the gaps between the idealised endpoints and the actual state of the correspondent 
institutions and processes in the recipient countries” (Petrova, 2012a; citing 
Carothers, 1997). Wedel (2005) points out that the Western donors, led by the US, 
export their own models of ‘democracy’ when the centre of the attention is 
institutions. However, such understanding of democracy assistance often leads to 
highly criticised institution-centric and one-size-fits-all approaches. The first one often 
neglects other important elements of building democracy, such as focus on civil 
society. Further, while stressing the endpoints, it fails to concentrate and advance the 
process of achieving the aims (ibid). One-size-fits-all strategies, on the other hand, 
approach similar countries uniformly, ignoring their specificities. This culture-
blindness has often led to ineffective programmes as well as to decreased credibility 
of the donor in the eyes of the recipient (e.g. post-communist countries) (Wedel, 
2005). 
Different actors’ approaches can also converge based on their mutual learning, either 
in terms of donors’ cooperation or when a recipient becomes a donor. Over time, 
these ‘best practices’ convergences created an international normative consensus on 
the centrality of practices and values, such as civil society, elections or human rights, 
to a universal understanding of democracy and therefore, an international democracy 
assistance approaches (Petrova, 2012b). Other significant factors are such as 
donors’ identities and international perception, which often impact how the assistance 
is accepted or welcome by the recipients (Carothers, 2009).  
Last but crucial point is that democracy assistance approaches should always be 
formed according to recipients’ needs and the development of recipient country’s 
situation (Wedel, 2005). This means that even very distinctive donors’ approaches, if 
they work within the same country, should significantly converge based on the centre 
of their focus (Petrova, 2012b). In sum, according to Petrova (2012a, pg. 9), different 
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donor’s democracy assistance approaches should be explored in terms of factors 
influencing them most: “…the values and experiences of individual donors, and 
recipient’s democratisation needs”. 
Major Democracy Assistors 
 
The most influential actors in the democracy assistance field are the US and the EU 
(Carothers, 2009). While they both promote westernised liberal democracy they differ 
in their approaches. Carothers (2009) identifies two distinct approaches to 
democracy support: the political and the developmental. 
The political approach, preferred by the US, entails a more narrow conception of 
democracy focusing on promotion of elections and political liberties. The aid is 
directed at political processes and institutions (elections, politically oriented civil 
societies, political parties). The developmental approach, emphasised by the EU, 
differs as it focuses on a wider scope. It understands democracy as a process of 
economic and social modernisation. The concept includes concerns about justice 
and equality. It is a part of a broader development plan and uses indirect democracy 
promotion tools, for instance support of the local-level projects. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the political approach aims to bring about specific endpoints, while the 
developmental approach focuses more on democratic potential. This means that the 
political approach is more useful in shaping the process of transition, while the 
developmental is more effective in assisting consolidation (Carothers, 2009). The 
political approach has been criticised for “…too easily turning confrontational vis-à-vis 
‘host’ governments and producing unhelpful counter-reactions” (Carothers, 2009, pg. 
5). On the other hand, the developmental approach has been faulted for being “too 
vague and unassertive in a world where many leaders have learned to play a reform 
game with the international community, absorbing significant amounts of external 
political aid while avoiding genuine democratization” (Carothers, 2009, pg. 5). 
Today, there seems to be a global backlash against democracy promotion, especially 
in the US. The American association with military invasions, violations of human 
rights within and outside the US (Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay) prioritisation of their 
own interest and theories about the US involvement in the ‘coloured revolutions’ all 
contributed to its de-legitimisation as a democracy promoter (Hobson, 2009). Further, 
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the EU conditionality is reaching its limits and therefore there is a need for new 
democracy promotion strategies. The EU credibility can also be questioned due to its 
treatment of Turkey differently to other countries (Turkey is the only candidate 
country without a specific accession date) (McGlinchy, 2011). However, the EU 
accession of 2004, 2007 and 2013 has created a new generation of democracy 
assistors, consisting of smaller post-communist countries. These states’ historical 
experience with democracy and democratision is very recent and different from the 
Western ‘old’ democracies, which could serve as their added value on the democracy 
promotion scene. Still, despite the vast literature on democracy assistance of the US 
or the EU, there is just a few studies focusing on these small donors (Jonavicius, 
2008; Petrova, 2012a, 2012b). Moreover, these studies only focus on official 
democracy promotion strategies, rather than democracy assistance carried out by 
NGOs. Studies, which would offer framework or any information on democracy 
assistance of post-communist donors generally, or Slovakia specifically, where not 
found and therefore, it may be concluded that this field is deeply under-researched.      
Finally, the Arab Spring uprisings could be seen not only as a challenge for the 
international democracy promotion but also as an opportunity to regain credibility. 
The democratic progress in the region could have significant implications for relations 
with the West and especially for EU’s security interests. However, the most 
challenging issue for the Western promoters remains whether or how to engage with 
political Islamists (Burnell, 2013). “In the past the West has been wary about 
supporting democracy in countries where Islamists might come to power through the 
ballot box, just as during the Cold War the West seemed willing to prop up the 
developing world military and other dictatorships if communist insurgency seemed 
the most likely alternative” (Burnell, 2011, 6). Thus, the search for lessons about 
democracy assistance which are transferable from one country to another needs to 
proceed carefully, especially as the situation in the MENA region is unique in some 
important respects. However, this will be complicated as the difficulties of evaluation 
harden the ability to learn from the previous donor experience (ibid).    
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Conclusion  
 
As the understanding of democracy directly impacts its quality in a country, it is 
important that transforming countries and democracy assistors emphasise both, 
procedural and normative features of democracy, and therefore adopt Dahl’s (liberal) 
understanding. The literature shows that democratisation is a very complex and 
lengthy process, which means that Tunisia still has a long journey to go to make 
democracy ‘the only game in town’.  
Very important for the transformational process are economic, social, cultural and 
external conditions. Despite the fact that these conditions alone do not guarantee 
democratic development, they have a strong impact on democratisation as they can 
either advance it, or hinder it. The late twentieth century democratisations 
demonstrated the significance of external factors in particular and showed how 
democracy promoters, by acting upon these conditions, can positively or negatively 
impact the evolvement of country’s political systems. Slovakia’s transformation was 
most engendered by the external factors, of which most significant were the changes 
in Soviet policies and the incentives offered by the EU. On the contrary, Tunisia was 
most influenced by internal factors, such as economic grievances and mass citizen 
protests. These factors have also often been used to explain why the Arab states had 
been so resistant to democratisation despite the global trend. Even though the 
cultural argument concerning Islam’s incapacity to support democracy has been 
broadly used, it is insupportable as Koran does not state what characterises Islamic 
government. More useful in explaining the phenomenon seems to be ‘the rentier 
state theory’. The external factor played a role in the MENA region even prior the 
Arab revolutions, but due to US’ stance on Arab-Israeli conflict, double-standards, 
power interests or colonial history, the West lacks credibility and trustworthiness in 
the eyes of domestic population.  
Certainly, much of what Slovakia can offer Tunisia depends on parallels and 
differences between factors and circumstances influencing the two transformations. 
To make the distinction clearer, the literature review has classified the case studies 
into the wave theory, following Huntington’s concept. This project rejects the 
arguments that post-communist transformations constitute the fourth wave due to 
their distinctiveness from previous transitions, on basis that Huntington’s concept 
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does not foreclose divergent strains, but rather considers the third wave a diverse lot. 
Even though Arab Spring could constitute the fourth wave, being so close in time, it 
cannot be classified in a way with certainty. Still, this theory highlights that Slovakia’s 
and Tunisia’s transformations happened within very different global contexts and 
were influenced by different factors, which will be talked about later in the study.    
Democracy assistance never exists in a vacuum but follows from broader democracy 
promotion policies. In their democratisation projects, NGOs offer practical experience 
and technical expertise by focusing mostly on electoral support, civil society, and 
political society development. In their democracy assistance strategies, donors 
concentrate on supporting the liberal model of democracy, styled after the prevalent 
model in the West. This has attracted much criticism as it can often be perceived as 
imperialistic and culturally biased. Even though it must be admitted that the liberal 
model indeed promotes Western values, the critiques accusing it of reduction of 
democracy to holding elections or culture-blindness are unsupportable when looking 
at how democracy assistance is carried out on the ground. Moreover, the uniformity 
of donors’ approaches is important with respect to its effectiveness.  
It has been argued that donors’ democracy assistance approaches are shaped 
mainly by their domestic values, institutions and experience. However, these 
approaches should, first and foremost, reflect the needs of recipients and avoid often 
ineffective one-size-fits-all or institution centric approaches. If it is true that donors 
customise their approaches depending on their own experience and understanding, it 
may be assumed that countries with different experience with political systems and 
democracy will have different perceptions of what is the most effective way to 
democratise the recipient; and therefore their democracy assistance approaches will 
also differ. At the same time, there will be parallels, not only due to similarities of the 
donors, but mostly because of the need to always put recipients’ needs first.  
A large body of literature has explored the major democracy promoters, such as the 
US and the EU. However, smaller assistors’ emerged in and after the EU 2004 
accession remain deeply under-researched and the few existing studies focus on 
their official democracy promotion, rather than democracy assistance carried out on 
nongovernmental level. Therefore, identifying this gap in the literature, this research 
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not only contributes to the general theoretical studies on democratisation, but is one 
of the few to examine the little studied post-communist donors.  
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Slovakia’s	Democratisation	Experience	
 
As mentioned in the literature review, the crucial areas of focus of global NGOs’ 
democracy assistance activities are electoral support and capacity-building in civil 
society (Burnell, 2011). Therefore, to explore how Slovak NGOs can contribute to 
democratisation in Tunisia by sharing the Slovak experience, this chapter highlights 
these themes within Slovak democratisation. Doing this later enables the study to 
examine if these ‘lessons learnt’ reflect in NGO’ democracy assistance strategies and 
so offer a distinctive approach to electoral and capacity-building support. Except this 
domestic experience, Petrova (2012a) highlights that donors’ approaches are 
strongly influenced by learning from each other. Therefore, the chapter briefly 
outlines Slovak experience as a recipient and what it may have learnt from it. 
However, most focus must be on recipients’ needs and therefore, NGOs’ capability to 
transfer these ‘lessons learnt’ depends much on parallels and difference between the 
Slovak and Tunisian transformations. Due to the scope of this study it is not possible 
to provide a comprehensive insight into the problem, but the chapter will outline the 
differences, which democracy assistors should bear in mind in their attempts to apply 
Slovak experience in Tunisia. These differences will be later discussed by the 
participants.   
Slovakia’s Democratisation 
 
After decades of control by the Soviet Union, the situational break came for 
Czechoslovakia in the late 1980s, when Gorbachev revoked the Brezhnev doctrine 
and delegitimised Czechoslovak Communist Party’s leadership. Encouraged by the 
positive results of protests in Poland or Hungary, on 16th and 17th November 1989 
students in Bratislava and Prague called for democracy and formed opposition 
movements (Bartlova and Letz, 2005). The communist party did not dare use force 
but agreed to negotiations in which it lost its leading role. Due to its nonviolent 
nature, the revolution is known as the ‘Velvet Revolution’ (ibid). However, an 
overwhelming majority of Slovaks accepted the regime change passively. It can be 
concluded that the system did not collapse as a result of mass popular opposition in 
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Slovakia. Rather, it broke down due to the diffusion effect provoked by liberalisation 
of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin Wall and a mass demonstration in Prague 
(Butora and Butorova, 1991). 
 
The democratic parties won the founding election of 1990 and started transforming 
the political system, as well as the economy. However, Slovakia was dissatisfied with 
‘the power structure of the Czech-dominated unitary state’ (CSCE, 1993, pg. 3). 
Using increasingly strident anti-federation or anti-Czech rhetoric, the Movement for 
Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) led by Meciar and recruited from ex-communists, 
exploited the situation promising that independence would help achieve greater 
economic prosperity. The HZDS won 1992 election and Prime Ministers Meciar and 
Klaus reached an agreement on dissolution of the federation and establishment of an 
independent Slovak Republic on 1. January 1993 (Szomolanyi, 2004).  
The post-1994 development led to Slovakia’s deviation from the transformational 
path followed by its newly democratised neighbours. The ruling coalition had a 
negative impact on the quality of democracy as it was marked by authoritarianism, 
nationalism and populism (Butora and Butorova, 1999). Being recruited mostly from 
communists, the HZDS represented ‘an important strengthening of personnel 
continuity with the old regime’ (Szomolanyi, 2004). This indicates the absence of the 
revolutionary exchange of the elites as well as the absence of counter-elites ready to 
take over. Therefore, compared to Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia’s development was delayed by many years (ibid). This development led to 
rejections of Slovak applications for membership in the EU and NATO in 1997 and 
Slovakia got into an international isolation (Bartlova and Letz, 2005). Slovakia’s 
difficult transition trajectory may be explained by its more complicated, quadruple 
(democratisation, marketisation, stateness, nationhood) transformation (Kuzio, 2001). 
However, the Slovak experience of coping with authoritarianism and overcoming the 
unfavourable circumstances could serve as a useful lesson on the significance of the 
role of the civil society in the transformational process. The associations were 
harassed by Meciar’s administration, however, the persecution was counter-
productive, as in fact, the population took their minds off economic problems and 
started paying more attention to issues of democratic governance (Bartlova and Letz, 
2005). In defence, the NGOs mobilised and together with media and the opposition, 
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launched innovative electoral strategies, such as campaigns OK ’98 and Rock the 
vote ’98 (including public discussions, concerts, etc.), which aim was to mobilise 
citizens to participate in elections by increasing their awareness and secure citizen 
control over the election. These activities significantly contributed to a high election 
participation of 84. 4 %, which led to Meciar’s defeat and creation of a democratic 
and pro-reform government (Arbe et al., 2012). Even after 1998, when a state, rather 
than an enemy, became civil society’s partner, the NGOs continued in their role of 
watch dogs and critics, while also engaging in a dialogue with the government 
concerning the preparation of reforms (Butora and Butorova, 1999).  
Since the period of Meciar’s rule led to a political regression, it may be assumed that 
a consolidation in Slovakia started only after the 1998 (Szomolanyi, 2004). Like in 
other transforming CEE countries, the prospects of membership in the EU and NATO 
played a crucial role to the success, speed and comprehensiveness of reform-
making and overall democratisation process in Slovakia (OSCE, 1993). The country 
became a member of the NATO in March and the EU in May 2004 (Bartlova and 
Letz, 2005), which is often considered marking Slovakia’s consolidation 
accomplishment (Rupnik, 2007). Despite the fact that Slovakia is currently 
considered a consolidated democracy, recently, it has been showing some signs of 
backsliding due to broadened state interventionism, clientelism, hostility to the 
independent press and discontinued liberal-oriented economic reforms. This could be 
caused by the unfinished process of democratic political culture development with 
mind-sets of people still marked by communism or Meciarism, therefore more 
vulnerable to the authoritarian temptation (ibid). These setbacks may serve as a 
demonstration of the importance of democratic consolidation of a civic and political 
culture, ‘without which the legitimacy and stability of democratic institutions will 
always remain doubtful’ (Rupnik, 2007, pg. 19). The Slovak case also illustrates that 
issues largely neglected during transformation, can later return with a vengeance, as 
did corruption and clientelism in Slovakia (Butora, 2007). Therefore, the most current 
question concerning Slovak democracy is not if the country remains democratic, but 
rather what kind of democracy it will be.    
 
Foreign Democracy Assistors in Slovak democratisation 
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Democracy assistance provided to Slovakia mainly by the US and the EU primarily 
focused on economic transformation, a conversion of the political and legal systems 
to multiparty democracy as well as development of conditions for future NATO and 
EU memberships. Due to a specific nature of Slovak democratisation, donors 
concentrated on free and fair elections and guaranteeing human rights much longer, 
than in the Czech Republic (Wedel, 2005).  
Democracy assistance activities played a significant role for the 1998 election, when 
it concentrated on development of the civil society. Donors increased NGOs 
cooperation, which then mobilised to spread awareness about the importance of the 
election and citizen participation (Butora and Butorova, 1999). According to Butora 
and Butorova (1999, pg. 8), the high citizen turnout and the victory of the opposition 
is “…a remarkable argument for long term assistance aimed at fostering the growth 
of civil society, the rule of law, and democratic cultures”. 
After the EU and NATO accession in 2004, funding sources substantially reduced as 
donors shifted their attention East or Southeast. Overall, the civil society appreciated 
the pre-2004 assistance more than the later EU funded projects, as the aid in the first 
phases was more responsive to local needs and priorities were majorly established 
on the basis of mutual dialogue. Also, the assistance was more result-oriented and 
reporting procedures were much less bureaucratic, whilst today funded projects have 
very specific focus and limited duration, which often makes NGOs jump from project 
to project (Najslova, 2013).  
The USA 
 
The first and most immediate foreign assistance came from the US, which had 
already been active in the country before 1989 supporting the Czechoslovak dissent. 
The then activities targeted mostly political opposition parties and unions (Najslova, 
2012). The 1989 Support for East European Democracy Act identified economic 
transformation and democracy as main priorities of the US assistance (Wedel, 1995). 
Civil society development constituted only a portion of the assistance and it 
concentrated on democracy-building, social, environment and enterprise 
development (Najslova, 2013). 
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One of the most successful US activities were workshops, concerts and public 
debates aiming on raising awareness of young people of the importance of election 
participation. Campaigns such as ‘Rock the vote – Year of the election’ contributed to 
a high turnout, especially of the first voters, in the election of 1998, leading to 
Meciar’s loss (Najslova, 2013).    
However, working with US organisations, Slovak NGOs also experienced some 
difficulties. Wedel (2005) refers to these problems as typical for the US assistance’s 
one-size-fits-all approach. The US-based organisations sent their experts, who often 
did not know the local context, did not do a country specific need assessment, 
treated the locals with disrespect or required the domestic NGOs to subscribe to their 
pre-set of priorities (ibid). Despite these nuances, however, the overall US 
democracy assistance had an overwhelmingly positive impact on a democratic 
development in Slovakia (Najslova, 2013).  
The EU and member states 
 
In the period of 1993-2003, the key source of funding was the EU’s pre-accession 
programme PHARE. Its goal was to prepare Slovakia for later membership in the 
union through focusing on assistance with restructuring the economy (Najslova, 
2013). Besides the EU budget, the resources were also channelled through various 
bilateral democracy assistance programmes and embassy grants. The priority areas 
included civil society capacity-building, technical assistance, election campaigns and 
minority rights (Wedel, 2005). “Training and technical assistance were provided in 
priority areas agreed between the EU and national governments, a very different 
approach from US donors, as the EU’s programme was intended directly to induce 
structural reforms and harmonisation with EU legislation” (Najslova, 2013, pg. 11).  
From bilateral donors, most active were Netherlands, Germany and the United 
Kingdom (UK). Netherland’s assistance concentrated on supporting civil society and 
local governments. The UK’s assistance focused primarily on transition to market-
economy. Germany, besides sharing their sectoral know-how, they put more 
emphasis on working with individuals, instead of institutions. Also, hiring local stuff 
avoiding and one-size-fits-all approach, unlike the US, they were subjected to 
criticism only rarely (Najslova, 2013). 
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Differences and Parallels between Slovak and Tunisia’s 
transitions 
 
Even though democratisation brings about similar challenges for all transforming 
countries, as shown in the literature review, Slovakia and Tunisia have had to deal 
with the challenges in very different historical contexts, both international and 
domestic.  
Firstly, the bipolarity of the post-Cold War world and the fall of communism as an 
ideational alternative to liberal democracy predetermined Slovakia’s routing toward 
democracy and the West, supported by two main players, the EU and USA, who 
offered incentives for democratic development (Szomolanyi, 2004). However, today 
the world is more multipolar and Tunisia can choose from many models as it is being 
influenced by non-democratic regional actors, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, as well 
as superpowers like China, which promote development without tying it to liberal-
democratic reforms (Biscop et al., 2012).  
Existence of previous experience with democratisation could also play a major role. 
Slovakia’s (Czechoslovakia’s) interwar democratic experience with economic and 
personal freedom reflected in people’s general belief in democratic values and 
political participation and strengthened society’s determination to achieve 
consolidation (Bartlova and Letz, 2005). Tunisia, lacking this experience, is also 
fragmented by the diversification of opinions and requirements. The situation is 
further complicated by major differences between towns and the countryside, the 
relative absence of a strong middle-class, and emergence of a large number of 
radical religiously-motivated political movements (Biscop et al., 2012).  
As mentioned in the literature review, one of democracy’s preconditions is 
compliance between the nation and the state territory. Due to the legacy of 
colonialism, Tunisia lacks this compliance and citizens’ identities are often created on 
supranational (pan Arab) or local levels, creating tensions, which often lead to 
conflicts. Even though, after the split with the Czech Republic Slovakia had to build 
nationhood (Kuzio, 2001), the peaceful course of the split did not equip it with 
expertise to solve intense conflicts.  
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Also, in comparison to Arab Spring, Czechoslovak revolution was better organised, 
non-violent, with well-known leaders organised in opposition movements and 
requiring religious freedom. It is mainly the different culture and different perceptions 
of the role of the religion in a state, which could most impact Slovak ability to use its 
experience in order to contribute to and advance Tunisian democratisation process. 
Still, besides so many differences, there exist similarities too (Halliday, 2005). In both 
cases the impulse came from young people as a reaction to their economic 
grievances and in legacy to those, who had died fighting the authoritarian regime. 
The protestors were driven by hatred toward the existing political system, absence of 
freedom of press and speech, and centralisation of power (Miller et al., 2012) 
To conclude, it may be assumed that Slovak difficult democratisation process and its 
deviation from the transformational path followed by its newly democratised 
neighbours provide its NGOs with expertise, which other donors, and especially the 
old democracies, do not have. The NGOs can use very concrete lessons from Slovak 
democratisations to highlight the importance of revolutionary exchange of the elites 
or point to how problematic issues (nationalism in the Slovak case) can be used by 
authoritarians to gain power. Also, the Slovak NGOs’ experience of coping with 
authoritarianism and overcoming the unfavourable circumstances may serve as a 
useful lesson on the significance of the role of the civil society as a watchdog against 
authoritarian tendencies. Further, the assistors may apply strategies for citizen 
mobilisation used in successful campaigns such as Rock the vote ’98 and OK ’98. 
Overall, the difficulties of Slovak democratisation and the current democratic 
backsliding could serve as an illustration of the lengthy and complexity of the 
transformational process.  
Still, as foreign donors, especially the USA and EU, played a major role in 
strengthening the Slovak civil society, Slovak NGOs may adopt the tools, which 
proved effective in Slovak democratisation. Also, they may avoid mistakes of 
Western donors during Slovak democratisation, such as one-size-fits-all approaches 
and insufficient dialogue between the donors and the local recipient.  
Finally, Slovak democracy assistors should be aware of the differences between the 
two transformations, which may impact their ability to apply domestic ‘lessons learnt’ 
to Tunisia. Also, they could be expected to focus on changing the political culture, as 
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this is marked by the absence of democratic experience in the country. Despite the 
similarities between the two transformations, such as that both were inspired by 
economic grievances and triggered by young people calling for democratic values, 
the main problem for the Slovaks might be their lack of experience with the specific 
kind of national tensions characteristic for MENA region, as well as cultural and 
religious differences between the Arab and Central-European country. 															
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	Findings	and	Analysis	
 
This chapter focuses on findings and analysis of the qualitative data collected 
through semi-structured interviews with six representatives of Slovak 
nongovernmental, governmental and research organisations. As mentioned in the 
literature review, according to Petrova (2012a) donors‘ democracy support strategies 
are mostly influenced by a) the values and experience of individual donors, and b) 
the recipients’ democratisation needs. Therefore, the interview data are analysed in 
this chapter in two separate sections reflecting these two factors, while being 
analysed in a thematical manner.  
 
Firstly, the chapter examines the Slovak democracy assistance in terms of the values 
it promotes through the adoption of democracy promotion model and approach. 
Consequently, it  investigates whether the Slovak experience influences its 
democracy assistance strategies and how it reflects in NGOs‘ cooperation with the 
recipients. Highlighting the parallels and diifferences between the Slovak and 
Western organisations, finally, it sheds light on limitations of the Slovak organisations 
in Tunisia.  
Values 
 
The Model 
 
As mentioned, in its transformational process, multiple distinctive donors offer Tunisia 
a number of different models of political systems to choose from. Therefore, to 
answer the reserach question, it is of utmost importance to determine what model 
Slovak NGOs use to advance Tunisia’s development and how, if at all, it diffes from 
the major Western donors.  
 
However, as NGOs‘ projects are chosen and financed majorly by SlovakAid and 
therefore follow official democracy promotion policies of the country, it is best to seek 
54 
 
this information at the level of the Government. As assumed, the collected data show 
a strong Slovak commitment to liberal democracy. Interviewee 1 (2013) explains that 
‘Slovakia, as a member of the EU, promotes liberal democratic values, shared by all 
the member states‘. Further, they state that ‘the Ministry pays a great attention to 
avoid suspicions of rivalling the EU’ and note that ‘…the progress achieved thanks to 
the Slovak democracy assistance activities in Tunisia has been highly appreciated 
even by the US’. These statements may be understood as demonstrating this post-
communist country’s efforts to anchor its ‘Western’ and ‘European’ identity. Also, as 
Slovak democracy assistance is bound by its EU membership commitments, it may 
be assumed that promoting any other model than liberal is not negotiable. This 
supports social-constructivist theory that state’s behaviour towards other actors is 
driven by its identity construction based on the assumption that “how you are 
perceived by others is of a crucial importance for the general understanding of who 
you are” (Jonavicius, 2008, pg. 2). Moreover, stressing liberal values in their projects, 
such as ‘political’ (Interviewee 3, 2013) and ‘civil rights’ (Interviewee 2, 2013) and 
‘inclusive suffrage’ (Interviewee 6, 2013), in their interviews NGOs representatives 
also confirm these findings. An instance of such project may be the series of trainings 
of Tunisian high school teachers of civics, whose role then was to interactively 
acquaint students with human rights and civil liberties, which are the central values of 
liberal democracy (Interviewee 2, 2013).   
 
Therefore, it may be concluded that the Slovak NGOs contribute to democratisation 
in Tunisia by putting an emphasis on the liberal aspects of democracy, and so to 
align themselves with ‘the message’ promoted by the major Western donors.  
The Approach      
 
The literature review shows that the major democracy assistors adhere to two main 
democracy support approaches: the political approach, used by the US, and the 
developmental approach, preferred by the EU. The first one focuses more on the 
political aspects of civil society and the support of a dialogue between civil society 
and policy-makers; the later concentrates more on conditions favourable to 
democracy such as economic factors or general education (Carothers, 2009). 
Establishing, which of these approaches Slovakia follows, allows us to determine if 
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Slovak NGOs contribute more to the political democratisation process, or to the more 
general development of favourable conditions in Tunisia.  
 
The approach adopted by the NGOs is strongly influenced by the official policy, 
which reflects in the government’s financial support of these projects (Interviewee 4, 
2013). Therefore, in order to determine the Slovak approach, it is vital to look at 
specifications of projects supported in Tunisia in the last two years as shown in Table 
1 and Table 2. 
 
NGO Project Aim Funding from the 
ODA 
Partners for 
Democratic 
Change Slovakia 
(PDCS) 
The Role of Civil 
Society in a Transition 
Period: Sharing the 
Slovak Experience with 
Tunisia  
 - to strengthen the civil 
society organisation 
(CSO) capacities by 
investing in their 
leaders and sharing the 
Slovak experience in 
CSO development, 
security sector reform, 
women’s empowerment 
and protection of 
human rights  
69 998. 20 € 
Civic Eye Increasing the Capacity 
of Domestic Election 
Observers in Tunisia 
- to increase the 
capacities of the 
partner organisation in 
specific areas of 
election monitoring  
69 920 € 
eSlovakia Ambassadors of 
Democracy – 
Democratic 
Participation and Civil 
Society Development 
- to spread information 
about democracy 
among students and 
political civil society by 
means of comic books 
and a handbook 
69 560 € 
Table 1 - Grants awarded to Slovak NGOs within Current Development calls for Tunisia in 2011 (Interviewee 1, 
2013) 
 
 
NGO Project Aid Funding from the 
ODA 
PDCS Rooting of the Tunisian 
change success story: 
public dialogue and 
civic awareness 
- to strengthen the 
capacities of NGOs and 
their leaders; to root the 
positive changes 
related to the 
transformational 
process 
99 937. 40 € 
Pontis 
Foundation 
Building Partnerships 
for Democracy in 
Tunisia 
- to build professional 
NGO capacities and 
contribute to 
94 963. 63 € 
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strengthening relations 
between the civil 
society and the 
government  
SAC Security Sector Reform 
in Tunisia: the Way 
Ahead 
- to transfer Slovak 
security sector reform 
experience and prepare 
the police to operate in 
compliance with 
democratic principles  
91 407 € 
Table 2 - Grants awarded to Slovak NGOs within Current Development calls for Tunisia in 2012 (Interviewee 1, 
2013) 
 
Overall, in the past two years the Slovak government have supported six projects 
focusing majorly on elections, security sector reform and democratic civil-society 
building, as well as strengthening the dialogue between the civil society and the 
government. Therefore, it follows that it is more knowledge-based and political, rather 
than developmental or economic by nature.  
Experience 
 
It has been established that Slovak NGOs, similarly to the Western organisations, 
promote liberal democracy while adopting political approach preferred by the US. In 
this respect, the Slovak democracy assistance does not differ from the Western 
support. Therefore, it may be assumed that due to the limited finances, for Slovak 
democracy assistance to matter it has to offer something unique, which could fill in a 
vacant thematical niche, and following Petrova’s (2012a) assumption that donors’ 
approaches depend on their understanding of the successes and failures of 
democratisation or democracy at home, the author sought to determine how, or if at 
all, the Slovak democratisation experience influences NGOs’ strategies.  
Task Force Tunisia 
 
First of all, it was important to clarify why Slovakia has decided to engage in Tunisia 
at a formal level and what it can offer despite the very different historical and cultural 
contexts of the two transformations. 
 
All the interviewees share the view that, similarly as it did in many post-communist 
countries before, Slovakia can offer Tunisia the most by sharing its own 
transformational know-how. Interviewee 5 points out that in their own experience, the 
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success of developmental cooperation is conditional on the progress in 
democratisation and building functioning economy, and therefore they consider 
sharing Slovak ‘direct and ongoing transformational experience’ the most significant 
added value of its developmental and democracy assistance. Interviewee 1 (2013) 
stresses out that Slovakia’s 2011 decision to co-chair Community of Democracies’ 
Task Force on Tunisia together with Netherlands was based on recognition that 
Slovak practical experience from its own democratisation can help advance Tunisia’s 
transition, which would at the same time benefit from Netherlands’ long tradition of 
democracy promotion. Interviewee 1 (2013) also emphasises that Slovak decision to 
engage in Tunisia was ‘natural considering its unique experience among the EU 
members’ and was ‘highly appreciated and supported by the US’. This statement 
may be considered another implication of Slovakia’s desire to anchor its ‘Western 
identity’ and in this sense, Slovakia’s engagement in Tunisia may be understood as 
Slovakia’s effort to demonstrate its loyalty to liberal democratic values of the West, 
while using its specific experience with democratic transformation as a comparative 
advantage. 
 
However, Interviewee 1 (2013) further states that ‘the beginnings of the Slovak-
Tunisian cooperation presented a challenge for Slovakia due to the absence of 
intensive political relations between the countries; also the communication was 
hardened by the absence of Slovak direct representation in Tunisia’. They point out 
that the biggest encouragement for Slovakia to engage in Tunisia despite these odds 
was Tunisian interest in its experience, as Tunisia identified a list of priority reform 
areas in which it could benefit from Slovakia’s experience:  
 
a) Security sector reform 
b) Judicial reform  
c) Public administration reform 
d) Promotion of regional development 
e) Civil society building 
 
Interviewee 1 (2013) further explains that although Slovakia has experience in each 
of the areas, it had to take into account its limited resources and so it identified areas 
in which its assistance would be most beneficial for the recipient. Therefore, 
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democracy assistance to Tunisia is provided mainly as a ‘technical and expert 
cooperation’ (Interviewee 5, 2013) and ‘experience transfer’ (Interviewee 4, 2013) 
‘focusing primarily on civil society building, elections, civil engagement in security 
sector reform, and strengthening dialogue between the civil society and government’ 
(Interviewee 1, 2013) (see Table 1 and Table 2). This statement supports Burnell’s 
(2011) claim that democracy assistance activities primarily target electoral support 
and capacity-building in civil society. Furthermore, it supports assumptions made in 
the previous chapter that the Slovak democracy assistance would reflect upon the 
most crucial aspects of its own transformation, which were the 1998 election, civil 
society building, and civil society’s engagement in dialogue with the government and 
security sector reform.   
 
Focus on Civil Society Building and NGO Development  
 
Further, the interviewees were asked to describe the Slovak comparative advantage 
in Tunisia more specifically, emphasising its added value in comparison to the 
Western donors, but also within the V4 group.  
 
According to Interviewee 2 (2013), despite the different cultural, political and 
economic background, the process of democratisation brings very similar challenges 
and therefore ‘lessons learnt by Slovakia during its transformation positioned it well to 
offer Tunisia a valuable and practical insight into civil society building, civic 
association and NGO development, as well as issues related to security sector 
reform, such as cultivation of civil-military relations’. They further state that sharing 
this expertise, which ‘other donors, especially the ‘old democracies’, do not have’, is 
also important in terms of creating a global transitional memory, which can both 
inspire and warn newly transitioning countries. Interviewee 5 (2013) and Interviewee 
6 (2013) emphasise that in their projects, Slovak NGOs focus not only on best 
practices, but also negative ‘lessons learnt’, which illustrate to recipients how 
different steps and decisions may work out, and what issues may require higher 
attention or should be avoided. Moreover, Interviewee 6 (2013) states that ‘…before 
Tunisian elections, we tried to illustrate to the recipients how important it is for a real 
democratic development to ensure a genuine exchange of governing elites. To do so, 
we pointed to Meciar’s post-revolutionary rule in Slovakia and to the fact that majority 
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of his party members were former communists’. Interviewee 2 (2013) adds that the 
experience with Meciarism also illustrates the dangers of empowering radicals, which 
is very current in Tunisia, even though the context is very different (e.g. in Tunisia, 
the disputes on the role of religion in a country, and the issue of nationhood and 
stateness in Slovakia). This experience with authoritarianism and the related 
oppression of the democratic civil society makes the Slovak experience unique even 
within the V4 group (Interviewee 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, 2013). 
 
According to the interview data, the Tunisian population as well as the civil society 
actors have often been impatient (Interviewee 5, 2013) and expected 
democratisation to solve various problems in a short time (Interviewee 2, 2013). 
Interviewee 3 (2013) states that having had an elected but authoritarian post-
revolutionary government, the Slovak NGOs understand that democratisation is a 
complex and lengthy process, which may be protracted beyond any formal 
transitional period. Interviewee 2 (2013) explains that together with the case of 
Slovakia’s current democratic backsliding they use this point to illustrate their 
partners that it is not possible to solve all the problems they plan in a short time. 
However, it is important that donors communicate this issue to the partners very 
sensitively: “We cannot tell them that their plans will not work out, because we may 
discourage them from progressing. At our trainings, we try to use the Slovak example 
to demonstrate that democratisation and especially a genuine change of people’s 
mindsets are lengthy processes, but, at the same time, the trainings have to give the 
participants effective and concrete guidance; otherwise they may not come back” 
(Interviewee 5, 2013).   
 
Furthermore, Interviewee 3, 4 and 6 (2013) emphasise that Slovakia, based on its 
communist and authoritarian experience, can offer Tunisia a practical comparison of 
life in nondemocratic and democratic systems. They maintain that its uniqueness lies 
in that, unlike the ‘old democracies’ (Germany, Netherlands, the UK, the US) whose 
experience is too far-back-in-time to be relevant in the modern world, or unlike the 
one of other post-communist countries’, which transitioned relatively fast (the Czech 
Republic, Poland), Slovakia’s experience with authoritarianism and democracy is 
very current, which makes the comparisons more ‘authentic’ (Interviewee 5, 2013). 
Interviewee 6 (2013) explains that because of the Tunisian previous absence of 
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experience with democracy, the recipients often do not understand that differences in 
opinions are ‘good and in fact very desirable, as they help question and reconsider 
stances and opinions’. The inability of reaching a political consensus together with 
protracted debates is often perceived as hindering the democratic development 
(ibid). Interviewee 6 (2013) demonstrates the usability of the Slovak experience in 
this case: ‘In our project, we point to how the Communist Party and later Meciar’s 
coalition always reached a consensus very quickly, but, in fact, for Slovakia it might 
have been more useful if there was someone who would slow down the decision 
making process and point out to the controversial issues in their policy-making’. 
Interviewee 4 (2013) stresses out that Dzurinda’s post-1998 coalition, on the other 
hand, which consisted of nine ideologically different parties1, led Slovakia to the EU 
and NATO integration and hence to democratic consolidation. Interviewee 5 (2013) 
explains that this impatience is a result of Tunisian civil society representatives’ lack 
of necessary understanding of democracy and its principles. Therefore, they highlight 
that it is not only the political system which requires change, but most importantly it is 
the change of people mindsets and the political culture. To illustrate their point, 
Interviewee 5 (2013) points out to the current democratic backsliding of Slovakia 
which, in their opinion, is a result of uncompleted change of political culture in the 
country, not only on the elites’ side, but most importantly in ‘the voters’ psyche’, who, 
when taken as a whole, as they still prefer ‘stronger, more authoritarian-like rhetoric’.  
 
Furthermore, Interviewee 2, 5 and 6 (2013) underline that the most valuable about 
the Slovak expertise is the civil-society building know-how, which the NGOs 
accumulated during the tumultuous Slovak transformation. The hardships which the 
Slovak NGOs had to undergo during Meciarism made the non-governmental sector 
stronger and more vibrant even in comparison with other post-communist countries, 
and positioned it well to operate in oppressive environments (Interviewee 2, 2013). A 
strength of the Slovak non-governmental sector compared to the other countries, 
especially ‘the old democracies’, is that it not only uses best practices from its own 
                                                
1
 In the election campaign of 1998 five left-right opposition parties (KDH, the DU, the SDSS, the DS and the SZS) 
formed a unified bloc, the SDK (the Slovak Democratic Coalition). Although the HZDS won the election, no party 
was willing to enter into a coalition with it and so it became isolated on the political spectrum. An alliance of four 
parties was formed (SDK, SDL, SMK, SOP), also called ‘a great coalition’ (Szomolanyi, 2004). 
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experience but it has also learnt from the practise, both positive and negative, of 
foreign donors operating in Slovakia during its transformation (Interviewee 2, 3, 5 and 
6, 2013).   
 
Interviewee 3 emphasises the importance of the ‘lessons learnt’ from the US 
strategies and support provided to Slovakia during the 1990s, and names the 
campaigns OK’98 and Rock the Vote as very positive instances of democracy 
assistance in the country. Most interviewees (Interviewee 2, 3, 5 and 6, 2013) 
mention the two campaigns and the use of the innovative strategies as an inspiration 
for their electoral support and citizen mobilisation in Tunisia. Interviewee 2 (2013) 
highlights the value and importance of this expertise for the recipients. They explain 
that after three decades of oppression, intimidation, and harassment under Ben Ali’s 
regime, the Tunisian civil society was extremely underdeveloped and a new Decree 
Law on Associations passed by the interim government resulted in emergence of 
approximately four thousand new NGOS. Interviewee 2 (2013) states that “many of 
them emerged because they wanted to contribute to a real change, but some may 
still only be interested in pursuing international funding or advancing political parties’ 
agendas”. 
 
Naturally, immediately after the revolution, the majority of NGOs focused on election 
monitoring and voter education. However, after the elections, these organisations lost 
their focused missions and were experiencing problems reorienting to other agendas 
(Interviewee 6, 2013). Interviewee 5 (2013) stresses out that “for a positive 
development of Tunisia‘s democratisation, a vibrant and effective civil society is 
essential”. However, Interviewee 2 (2013) explains that the transformational process 
in this sense will not be easy: “Both, newly emerged and long established 
associations, have weak organisational capacities and are still operating mostly on a 
voluntary principle”. The civil society organisations concentrated primarily on 
democratic transition and public mobilisation before elections; therefore they had little 
time to invest in development of their own structures, capacities, or long term 
planning. The leaders often lack basic NGO management and administration skills, 
as well as knowledge of project writing and project implementation (Interviewee 2, 
2013). Their missions are often vague as they focus on a wide range of issues, and 
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they need to transition their roles from election monitoring to serving as watchdogs 
for the civil society rights and democratic principles (Interviewee 5, 2013).  
 
Furthermore, the Tunisian civil society leaders need to learn how to actively engage 
in a dialogue with the government as well as to participate in decision making and 
law drafting (Interviewee 2, 2013). However, due to the animosity and distrust 
between the government and the society, many find it difficult to imagine the 
cooperation or don’t know how to advocate for reforms and hold the representatives 
accountable (Interviewee 2 and 6, 2013). For interviewee 6 (2013), this situation is 
very similar to the years after the Czechoslovak Velvet revolution, when people were 
in celebratory mood, but at the same time, there was ‘an atmosphere of fear and 
distrust’ and the civil society leaders saw themselves as watchdogs rather than 
governments’ partners. Here, they state, the Slovak NGOs can use their post-1998 
experience with building a dialogue with the government. Also, “for the newly 
emerged NGOs to survive and, at the same time, maintain their identities, they have 
to merge in larger wholes, associate in bigger platforms, and develop networking” 
(Interviewee 2, 2013). The recipients could, in this case, use a creation of NGO 
platforms in Slovakia as a positive example (Interviewee 5, 2013).  
The Process 
 
So far, it has been established that the Slovak NGOs base their democracy 
assistance strategies in Tunisia on their domestic experience and understanding of 
democracy, which indicates a distinctive national approach. This approach is 
undoubtedly influenced by the US and EU strategies applied in Slovakia during its 
own transformation. Therefore, this study further examines to what extent the Slovak 
NGOs’ projects and tools of providing the assistance differ from those used by the 
US and the EU. 
  
The interview analysis shows that the Slovak democracy assistance carried out by 
NGOs is primarily provided through projects taking a form of conferences 
(Interviewee 4, 2013), trainings (Interviewee 2, 5 and 6, 2013), publications of 
manuals (Interviewee 2, 3 and 5, 2013) and research summarising country’s 
transformational experience (Interviewee 2, 2013), as well as organising study trips 
to Slovakia to illustrate how democratic institutions and civil society organisations 
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may work in practise (Interviewee 2, 4, 5 and 6, 2013). All of these tools are included 
in Burnell’s (2011) list of most commonly used practices of the US and the EU, as 
shown in the literature review. Therefore, the way in which the projects of the Slovak 
NGOs are realised is akin to this of the Western donors. This finding further confirms 
Petrova’s (2012a) claim that different actors approaches can converge based on their 
learning from each other.  
 
Further, all the interviewed stressed out that their projects are developed in a way 
through that they can share the Slovak transformational know-how and use it as an 
added value of their assistance. This finding confirms Petrova’s (2012a) statement, 
mentioned in the literature review, that each donor’s democracy assistance is based 
on domestic institutions and understanding of democracy, and therefore taking a 
distinctive national approach. In this case, it may be said that relying on their specific 
domestic experience, the Slovak NGOs do not differ from the Western organisations 
which also adhere to distinct national approaches.  
 
However, the Slovak NGOs differ from the US and the EU ones by not adopting 
institution-centric approaches. Interviewee 5 (2013) explains that the Slovak NGOs 
do not like focusing mainly on institutions, as in their experience accumulated 
domestically in the 1990s, the civil society building, and the changing of political 
culture proved much more useful in achieving democratic development. Interviewee 
6 (2013) also maintain that institution centric approaches tend to focus on setting 
“desired endpoints, but struggle designing the set of steps how to get there”. 
According to the interviewee 5 (2013), Slovakia differs from the EU and the US by 
‘exporting a model of democratisation, rather than a model of democracy’. Other 
interviewees strengthen this point by describing their assistance as ‘inviting the 
partners to follow the Slovak successful journey’ (Interviewee 4, 2013), or ‘a long but 
successful story’ (Interviewee 3, 2013) while concentrating on ‘procedural aspects of 
democratisation’ (Interviewee 2, 2013). Interviewee 2 and 6 (2013) explain that when 
designing their projects they start from recipients’ needs and with a goal in mind, 
together they set up a set of steps for achieving the desired results while using the 
Slovak experience as a motivation or an illustration. Throughout the process, these 
steps are constantly redefined according to the development of the situation. The 
projects reflect upon the fact that democratisation is a process, which, may not be 
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completed even after more than two decades, illustrating that by the fact that the 
issue is still disputable in Slovakia. What they are trying to pass on to the recipients, 
‘instead of institutional blueprints’ (Interviewee 6, 2013), are rather instances of what 
works and what does not in attempt to defeat authoritarians and achieve 
consolidation; they offer “assistance with the process rather than endpoints” 
(Interviewee 5, 2013). 
Capacities 
 
However, one of the key problems of Slovak democracy assistance emphasised by 
all the nongovernmental respondents is that country’s transformational know-how, 
which is now being used as an added value, is slowly losing its hallmark of 
authenticity. According to Interviewee 5 (2013), the democratisation experience has 
not been captured sufficiently at the domestic level and “now it is getting more and 
more problematic to find someone who was directly present when changes were 
made and would now be willing to share this experience”. Interviewee 4 (2013) adds 
that majority of people who contributed or were directly responsible for the changes, 
on both governmental and non-governmental level, now either hold governmental 
positions, changed their professions entirely, or have retired. Furthermore, 
Interviewee 3 (2013) notes that without people with direct experience who would be 
willing to share it, it is difficult to transfer or make use of any direct ‘lessons learnt’ 
and a deeper analysis and expertise of the Slovak transformation is necessary. 
 
Interviewee 5 (2013) emphasises that the recipients are in fact interested not only in 
constitutional changes and reforms, which can always be transcribed, but, most 
importantly, it is the backstage information, for instance about the course of 
negotiations or the resolutions of different dilemmas. He recalls a visit of Tunisian 
NGO leaders at Slovak Nation’s Memory Institute and explains that “what they found 
interesting was that they met a person who knew both Czech and Slovak model of 
the institute and was able to reason to them why the Czech model is better and what 
factors were decisive in deciding about the model to adopt”. Thus, if Slovakia wants 
to continue using its transformational experience as an added value, it is essential 
that it invests more domestically. In 2011, the Foreign Ministry founded a special 
Centre for the Transfer of Integration and Reform Experience (CETIR) which goal is 
to enhance democratic development by means of expert exchange mainly at 
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intergovernmental level (SlovakAid, 2013). Even though all the interviewed 
appreciated this initiative, Interviewee 4 and 5 (2013) underline that it would be even 
more effective to create a platform or more programs where experts from all levels 
would meet and exchange their know-how, discuss their experience, so that this 
knowledge could be captured, systematised, formulated, and subsequently 
transferred.  
 
However, despite these drawbacks, Interviewee 5 (2013) points to the fact that in 
Slovakia “there is still a number of individuals who were active in Slovak 
democratisation process or implemented reforms and have been still active in 
politics”, and concludes that the Slovak NGOs still may use these personal capacities 
as their comparative advantage, which older democracies, even those democratised 
in the third wave, such as Spain or Portugal, do not have. 
Focus on the Recipient 
 
As mentioned in the literature review, democracy assistance should always reflect 
recipients’ needs (Wedel, 2005). Petrova (2012b) reaches a conclusion that despite 
the distinctiveness of donors working within the same country, their approaches and 
strategies should significantly converge. Being interested in whether Slovak NGOs 
can contribute to Tunisian democratisation offering a distinctive kind of assistance, 
this study further examines to what extent, if any, Slovak NGOs differ from the 
Western organisations in their focus on recipient. Moreover, the literature review has 
pointed out that the US and the EU are often mistrusted in the Arab world, due to 
their power interests, double standards, and the use of violence in their democracy 
promotion (McGlinchy, 2011). Therefore, it may be concluded that receptivity of 
recipients also depends on the global perception of a donor as well as their historical 
background and donor-recipient bilateral relations. For this reason, this section starts 
with examination of the influence of Slovak global perception on receptivity of the 
Slovak NGOs’ democracy assistance in comparison to the Western donors and 
continues by outlining the differences between the Western and Slovak approaches.    
First of all, Interviewees 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 (2013) name the Slovak-Tunisian not 
burdened bilateral relations as another comparative advantage of the Slovak NGOs. 
Interviewee 3 (2013) explains that due to the fact that Tunisia was colonised by 
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France, it is now quite suspicious of assistance by countries with a colonial history 
and the population often sees the assistance as imperialistic. Interviewee 2 (2013) 
illustrates this by explaining that civil society leaders who accept aid from France or 
the US are often suspected of “plotting” against Tunisian interests. They add that 
considering the current significant position of France within the EU, this 
suspiciousness often spreads over the EU projects in general. Furthermore, “the EU 
and US are well-known for their power interests and double standards, which have 
discredited their assistance in the eyes of the Tunisian population“ (Interviewee 5, 
2013). 
 
These findings comply with Hobson’s (2009) and McGlinchy’s (2011) explanations of 
the decrease in credibility and receptibility of the Western donors’ assistance as 
stated in the literature review. Interviewee 3 (2013), stresses out that “on the other 
hand, Slovakia has never colonised anyone and has itself been occupied”, which, in 
combination with the fact that “that it does not have any ambitious power interests” 
(Interviewee 4, 2013), has a positive impact on receptivity of the beneficiaries 
(Interviewee 2, 3, 4 and 6, 2013). Moreover, the Slovak NGOs’ expertise and direct 
experience of coping with authoritarianism and contributing to achieving a 
consolidation at home, gives their projects “credibility to assist and advise” 
(Interviewee 5, 2013), the fact reported by all the interviewees.     
 
However, Interviewee 6 (2013) warns that the NGOs need to work very carefully with 
this premise. As already mentioned, the US support and often sponsor the Slovak 
NGOs’ activities (Interviewee 1 and 6, 2013), and the NGOs use many practices 
imported to them by the West earlier (Interviewee 2, 5 and 6, 2013). This may raise 
suspicions towards the Slovak projects (Interviewee 6, 2013). Najslova’s (2012) 
article supports this finding as she warns against the emerging trend in the MENA 
region to perceive smaller donors backed by the US as an ‘invisible Western hand’.  
 
Furthermore, the Slovak NGOs representatives (Interviewee 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, 2013) 
see their assistance as more sensitive and recipient-centred in comparison to the 
West countries’ practice. According to Interviewee 2 (2013), the recipient experience 
of Slovakia gives its NGOs a valuable insight into the Western democracy assistance 
practices. Therefore, the NGOs can not only use the best ‘lessons learnt’ from the 
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Western donors, but also avoid repeating their mistakes. The interviewees (2, 3, 4 
and 5, 2013) recall that the US often came to Slovakia with ‘complete recipes’ 
(Interviewee 5, 2013) of what should be done without asking the beneficiaries about 
their opinions of how to proceed. The US one-size-fits-all approach was, in their 
opinion, problematic considering the specificities of single post-communist countries 
(Interviewee 2, 5 and 6, 2013). This has taught the Slovak NGOs about the 
importance of cultural and historical sensitivity of their approaches (Interviewee 2, 
2013), as well as ‘beneficiaries’ ownership of the projects’ (Interviewee 5, 2013). 
Interviewees 2, 3, 5, and 6 (2013) state that in their projects, they operate as 
facilitators, but let the recipients to decide about what they need, what should be 
done and how. Interviewee 5 (2013) explains that Slovaks understand they are just 
‘foreigners’ in the country, and therefore do not understand many issues to such 
depth as the natives do. Based on that, they operate as trainers and facilitators who 
are in the country to offer their ‘experience through partnership’, rather than acting as 
‘teachers of democracy’ (Interviewee 5, 2013). They use the Slovak experience to 
inspire and motivate the beneficiaries, but not as a guaranteed recipe for success: 
“Unlike many Western donors, the Slovak NGOs do not attempt to provide partners 
with guaranteed recipes for how to achieve successful consolidation. If the Slovaks 
learnt something from the US’ practise during 1990s, it is that the transformational 
process cannot be copied and pasted across various countries, especially in the case 
of such different states as Slovakia and Tunisia” (ibid).  
 
The interviewee 2, 4, 5 and 6 (2013) stress out that they do not offer solutions, but 
rather to use the Slovak experience to show the recipients the variety of options and 
possible consequences of particular steps. According to them, the Slovak strength 
compared to other donors lays in facilitating such a discussion which then helps the 
beneficiaries to form an opinion. “Later, it is up to them if they decide that certain 
steps from our transition are executable in their conditions” (Interviewee 5, 2013). 
Furthermore, Interviewee 6 (2013) explains that having experienced the problems 
with funding and survival of positive changes in the civil society development after 
the US donors had started withdrawing from Slovakia, its NGOs now reflect on that 
by designing projects so that they prepare the beneficiaries to work on their own, not 
only by granting them the ‘ownership’ of the work, but offering trainings focused on 
financing the activities.  
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Moreover, the Slovak NGOs’ projects seem to contrast with the Western one-size-
fits-all approaches by tailoring their activities to the recipient. This conclusion is 
based on the interview data which show that each of the Slovak NGO engaging in 
Tunisia designed its project after thoroughly consulting local partners. These 
consultations (also taking form of seminars) focused on direct requirements, needs 
and specificities of individual beneficiaries, while differences were considered and 
reflected upon in democracy assistance strategies even in case of cooperation with 
very similar organisations within the same locality (Interviewee 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, 
2013).   
Limitations 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Slovakia and Tunisia differ historically, 
politically, and culturally. Therefore, this chapter examines what and to what extent, 
impacts the Slovak democracy assistance and transferability of its ‘lessons learnt’.  
 
Interviewee 4 (2013) explains that until 2011, when Tunisia became a priority within 
the Slovak Official Development Aid (ODA), the NGOs’ democracy assistance had 
territorially focused mainly on the Western Balkans (Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia) 
and countries of the EU’s Eastern Partnership (Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine), which came as a natural choice with respect to Slovakia‘s politico-
economic interests in the region, and relatively similar post-communist 
transformational context as well as Slavic cultural and linguistic affinities. Especially 
in Balkans, the Slovak expertise has always been accepted with appreciation, 
particularly due to its success to achieve Euro-Atlantic integration, even though it had 
to catch up with other applicants, who had had smoother transitions (ibid). In Tunisia, 
on the other hand, “due to country’s different historical and political background, and, 
most importantly, the absence of previous democratic experience” (ibid), the NGOs 
have had to deal with ‘very different, non-western understanding of reforms and 
needs’ (Interviewee 5, 2013), perceptions of modernisation, and ideas about both 
stable and democratic development (Interviewee 2 and 5, 2013). Interviewee 4 
(2013) emphasises that the quality of discussion or acceptance of the content of 
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information may be in the Arab conditions very different from the post-communist 
region, in which the Slovak NGOs usually work. In this respect, the interviewees 2, 3, 
4 and 5 (2013) describe the beginnings of their engagement in Tunisia as “going 
blind on”. According to Interviewee 2 (2013), the NGOs lacked the knowledge of the 
‘work field’, did not know their partners’ work habits, or faced language barriers. 
Therefore, Interviewee 2, 3, 4, and 6 (2013) agreed that Slovak NGOs have a greater 
advantage and may be more efficient in their neighbourhood, the countries which 
have experience with kinds of political structures similar to those in past Slovak 
nondemocratic regimes.  
 
However, Interviewee 5 (2013) questions the similarity of Balkan countries with 
Slovakia pointing to very different development of the states during 1990s. They 
stress out that, unlike in Slovakia, the conflicts in Balkan inflicted lives of the people 
to such an extent that this difference may in fact render the Slovak experience, in 
many aspects, untransferable. Therefore, according to Interviewee 2, 5, and 6 (2013) 
the differences do not play a major role in democracy assistance, if they are 
articulated in a way which helps recipients clarify the matters for themselves. They 
consider differences in general, if worked with sensitively, enriching because they 
help form opinions on the basis of critical thinking, which should then lead to a most 
reasonable and suitable choice. Yet, Interviewee 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 (2013) emphasise 
the need for sensitive facilitation of these differences in diverse environments.  
 
One of the issues, which the interviewees 2, 4 and 6 (2013) see as problematic is 
Slovakia´s lack of experience with regional tensions characteristic for Tunisia. 
Interviewee 6 (2013) explains that due to the colonisation, Tunisian borders were not 
created in a natural way, and therefore the population’s identities are often based on 
local levels, which leads to “conflicts and misunderstandings”. According to 
Interviewee 2, 5 and 6 (2013), this incompliance of borders and the nation may slow 
down or hinder the Tunisian democratisation process. This finding supports Rustow’s 
(1970) argument, as stated in the literature review, that for a democratic 
development, national unity is one of the most important preconditions. However, 
Interviewee 6 (2013) states that the absence of such experience on the Slovak side 
may not be a disadvantage. According to them, considering the Czechoslovak split in 
1993 or Roma and Hungarian minority problems, “it is this absence of the conflict 
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which illustrates to partners that problems can be dealt with effectively in a peaceful, 
nonviolent way”. Further, they add that the Slovak NGOs can offer a valuable lesson 
highlighting the fact that in Slovakia the minority or nationalism issues were often 
ignored and left unresolved, which then led to their constant reappearance.  
 
However, all the interviewed stressed out that what the Slovak NGOs have to 
consider when passing on certain ‘lessons learnt’ is that the Slovak democratisation 
was, to a great extent, influenced by the EU and NATO integration ambitions, while 
Tunisia lacks such strong motivations or incentives. Interviewee 5 (2013) states that, 
for instance, the security sector reform in Slovakia was influenced by requirements 
from the NATO, ‘which may be very sensitive in Arab environments due to the 
animosity and distrust the population feel towards the organisation’.  
 
Yet, the biggest problem for the Slovak NGOs operating in Tunisia may be the role of 
religion in the state (Interviewee 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, 2013). Interviewee 6 (2013) 
explains that during Bourguiby’s and Ben Ali’s regime Tunisia belonged to one of the 
most liberal countries in the region due the nature of the regimes, and now, it is “in 
the process of discovering its own diversity”. Interviewee 2 (2013) points out that 
Slovakia is not the only donor facing this problem, as there are not many instances of 
dealing with the issue successfully, stably, and without ‘spike solutions’. According to 
Interviewee 6 (2013), in this case, out of all the cooperating countries’, the most 
useful may be the example and assistance of Turkey, which, however, “for now, does 
not seem very realistic”. Further, the NGO representatives (Interviewee 2, 3, 4, 5 and 
6, 2013) state that to operate effectively, they have to bring many topics through 
Islam, such as women empowerment or democracy itself. They state that in case of 
empowering women’s right, they often have to work with men more than with women 
themselves. In this respect, due to the Slovak inexperience with Islam, they adopt 
approaches used by the US and the EU. Finally, all the interviewed agree that 
despite the cultural differences, the Slovak experience is relevant for Tunisia, as it 
focuses on supporting the basic democratic principles, which they understand as 
“universal”. This stance supports Diamond’s (2010) and Ramadan’s (2013) claims 
about universality of democratic principles in Islamic cultures, as mentioned in the 
literature review.  
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However, all the interviewees from the nongovernmental sector also report the 
insufficiency of financing as negatively influencing the effectiveness of their work, 
mainly due to the inability to make long-term plans. Annual calls for grants make 
them “jump from one project to another without any certainty about what is going to 
happen next year” (Interviewee 3, 2013). Interviewee 5 (2013) points out that the 
financial instability also negatively influences the ability of Slovak NGOs to transfer 
the experience, as instead of focusing on capturing and formulating it, the 
nongovernmental sector has been struggling with existential problems. All the 
interviewed emphasise that for the effectiveness of their projects a long-term 
planning is essential since the evaluations have shown that short-time activities were 
ineffective for the recipients as well as the donors in respect to all the funds spent. 
Also, as Interviewee 2 (2013) explains, in 2011, the working environment of Tunisia 
was majorly unknown to most of the Slovak NGOs, and therefore, to increase 
effectiveness of the projects, some money could have been allocated to organise 
study trips into the field for experts to map the situation and identify potential partners 
instead of having to carry out these activities simultaneously with their projects later. 
It is understandable that if the Foreign Ministry cannot allocate more funds for 
democracy assistance, especially in times after the financial crisis. However, within 
the ODA, the Education Ministry allocates about two million euros annually for 
scholarships offered to students from developing countries without binding them to 
return home, and so far there has been no statistics about how many of them actually 
do return to their homes. Therefore, it might be worth considering reallocating these 
funds and using them as grants for the nongovernmental sector, which may then 
reflect in increased quality and effectiveness of their work. However, limited financing 
does not always need to be a disadvantage. Interviewee 6 (2013) maintains that 
smaller projects are more flexible and less fraud-prone, and the NGOs are not afraid 
to partner a young or smaller organisation outside the town, unlike many Western 
donors.    
 
The results of this analysis show that the Slovak NGOs can contribute to the 
democratisation of Tunisia mainly by sharing expertise and ‘lessons learnt’ 
accumulated during its own tumultuous transformation. The crucial aspects of its own 
democratisation, such as electoral breakthrough of 1998, civil society building and 
engaging in a dialogue with the government, positioned Slovakia well to provide 
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Tunisia with a practical insight  to civil-society building, NGO development as well as 
issues related to security sector reform, such as cultivation of civil-military relations. 
Considering, that due to its previous absence of democratic experience, expertise in 
these fields may be very valuable for Tunisia, which is currently experiencing a high 
increase in civic associations and because of the suppression during the past 
dictatorial regime, does not, at this moment, know how cooperation with the 
government should look like. An added value of Slovak democracy assistance for 
Tunisia rests not only in its transformational experience, but also in the fact that this 
experience allows the NGOs to pass along best practices of the Western donors and 
avoid their mistakes, such as institution-centric and one-size-fits-all approaches.  
Having an experience from the recipient side of the democracy assistance process, 
the Slovak NGO realise the importance of cultural sensitivity and their partners’ 
ownership of the project. Also, in comparison to the US and the EU, they tend to be 
more recipient-focused. Even though the Slovak organisations do not differ much 
from the Western organisation in terms of the values being promoted or in terms of 
the way in which their projects are being realised, the recency of Slovak 
democratisation allows them to contribute to the advancement of Tunisia’s 
democratisation by providing the partners with experts who have a direct experience 
with the transformational process and therefore can offer very concrete ‘lessons 
learnt’. The Slovak NGOs have also developed ways, in which they can use 
disadvantages, such as the Slovak lack of experience with regional tensions similar 
to the ones of Tunisia or the role of the religion in a state, to show their partners the 
variety of choices, which can inspire them and support further debates. Hence, all 
these findings support the assumptions made in the previous chapter about how the 
Slovak democratisation experience may reflect in its democracy assistance.  
In order to get a more throughout understanding of the results of this study, the next 
chapter concentrates on the conclusions drawn from the research as well as 
recommendations for future policies and research.   
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Conclusions	and	Recommendations	
 
It has been more than three years since the events of the Tunisian Jasmine 
revolution initiated the massive democratic movement throughout the MENA region 
and captured the attention of the international democracy assistors. Together with 
the major donors, such as the EU and the US, Slovakia, joining forces with 
Netherlands in Task Force on Tunisia created by the Community of Democracies, 
offered Tunisia its expertise to advance country‘s democratic development. However, 
considering the Slovak limited finances as well as the global perception, a question 
arises whether Slovak democracy assistance can make any meaningful contribution 
working side by side the biggest global democracy supporters. Starting from the 
assumption that donors‘ understanding and experience with democracy at home 
reflect in their international democracy support, this study has investigated whether 
the Slovak recent democratisation experience reflects in its democracy assistance to 
Tunisia and whether it makes it distinctive from the democracy assistance of major 
donors. Therefore, the research question examined in this project was ‘how Slovak 
NGOs can contribute to democratisation of Tunisia’.   
The project has focused on democracy assistance carried out by NGOs, rather than 
broader democracy promotion, not only due to the prevalence of this method but 
mainly because NGOs’ relative independence and variousness best allow shedding 
light on the parallels and differences between democracy support approaches.  
This research was necessary considering that Tunisia is currently facing challenges 
of democratic transformation dealing with which it could benefit from democratisation 
expertise of other countries. However, as the major donors have been discredited in 
the MENA region, this research was needed in order to examine the potential of the 
new generation of democracy promoters produced by the recent EU accessions, 
here represented by Slovakia. Despite the fact that these countries’ recent 
transformational experience gives them potential to offer a distinctive expertise on 
the democracy support scene, the vast body of theoretical literature has focused on 
the major global donors, leaving smaller donors under-researched. Therefore, this 
study not only contributes to previous research on the role of foreign actors in 
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democratisation but, most importantly, it is one of a few to concentrate on a smaller 
post-communist donor’s democracy assistance.      
This chapter discusses the empirical findings reached through the qualitative data 
analysis, which is then followed by theoretical implications of the study, giving 
recommendations for future policies as well as the future research.  
Empirical findings 
 
It has been assumed that for Slovak NGOs to make any meaningful contribution to 
Tunisia’s democratisation, considered Slovakia’s limited finances and the global 
perception, their projects should fill in a vacant but important thematical niche in the 
projects of other donors and emphasise the added value of the Slovak expertise.  
In order to examine to what extent this experience distinguishes the Slovak NGOs’ 
operations from Western donors’, the study has firstly investigated the values, which 
the Slovak NGOs’ projects promote and whether they have a potential to challenge 
the major model of democracy promotion, i.e. liberalism. It has been found that, in 
their activities, the NGOs contribute to democratisation in Tunisia, similarly to the EU 
and the US, by stressing liberal aspects of democracy, such as civil liberties and 
political rights. Furthermore, the fact that all six Slovak NGOs’ projects in Tunisia in 
the past two years have focused primarily on electoral support, security sector reform 
and democratic civil society building, implies that Slovakia, likewise the US, adopts a 
knowledge-based political approach, rather than developmental approach, used 
majorly by the EU. This means that the NGOs contribute to Tunisia’s democratisation 
by advancing political aspects of civil society building, and therefore support 
development of political culture, rather than development of other preconditions of 
democracy, such as economy or societal development. The loyalty of Slovak 
democracy assistance to liberal values follows from country’s EU membership, as 
well as from its desire to anchor its European and Western identity. Therefore, the 
Slovak NGOs do not challenge the liberal model of democracy promotion and hence, 
in this sense, do not differ from the Western donors. 
However, even though the Slovak and the Western democracy assistance promote 
the same values, the process through which it is done is different. The research has 
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shown, that Slovakia’s very recent experience and ‘lessons learnt’ accumulated 
throughout its arguably not completed democratisation process, provide its NGOs 
with a comparative advantage, which other donors, and especially the ‘old 
democracies’, do not have. This experience gives the Slovak NGOs credibility to 
inspire and motivate the recipients using illustrations from the Slovak transformation. 
Moreover, even despite it is currently getting more problematic to find persons who 
were directly present when changes were made and would now be willing to share 
their experience, Slovakia, unlike older democracies, still has enough experts to 
offer. These experts can contribute to Tunisia’s transformation by providing their 
unique direct know-how, such as information about backroom deals and negotiations. 
This implies Slovakia’s distinctive national approach to democracy assistance. 
In their projects, the NGOs do not only highlight Slovakia’s successes on its way to 
democracy, but also point out the negative ‘lessons learnt’, in order to show the 
partners where certain steps may lead. Realising that the democratisation process is 
not a matter of replication, instead of offering guaranteed recipes, the NGOs use the 
Slovak expertise to advise the beneficiaries on their transformational path. Thanks to 
Slovakia’s own lengthy and difficult democratisation, its NGOs realise the complexity 
of the political transformation and see democracy as a constantly developing 
process, rather than an endpoint. This reflects in their projects, which focus on 
assisting the partners with throughout planning, while the aims are set sequentially. 
This is in contrast with Western donors’ projects, which often emphasize the 
endpoints but leave recipients unsure about how to proceed to achieve them. 
Therefore, rather than a model of democracy, Slovakia exports a model of 
democratisation based on its domestic experience.  
Moreover, the Slovak NGOs have accumulated experience from both sides of 
democracy assistance process, as a recipient and a donor. This allows them passing 
along best practices of the Western donors, while at the same time avoiding their 
mistakes, such as one-size-fits-all approaches. Based on their recipient experience, 
the Slovak NGOs realise the importance of cultural sensitivity and their partner’s 
‘ownership’ of the projects. Therefore, in their projects, they operate as advisors, 
rather than teachers or democracy. Furthermore, the Slovak NGOs pay much 
attention to recipients’ needs and design their projects accordingly, in contrast with 
many Western organisations, which use pre-set programs. 
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Another factor, which positively influences the receptivity of Tunisian beneficiaries, is 
the global perception of Slovakia as a smaller country, which is not well known for its 
power interests. Also, the fact that it has never colonised anyone increased the 
credibility of its assistance. Moreover, even the limited finances, which may seem a 
disadvantage of the Slovak democracy assistance projects, could be considered an 
advantage, as the Slovak donors are not afraid to partner a younger or smaller 
recipient; also, the projects are less bound to fraud and more flexible to react to 
situational development.  
Hence, by their distinctive national approach to democracy assistance, the focus of 
their democracy assistance on the process rather than endpoints and by the high 
attention they pay to beneficiaries’, the Slovak NGOs differ from the Western 
organisations’ operations.  
Further, The NGOs concentrate mainly on aspects of the democratisation process 
which were crucial for Slovakia itself, such as civil society building, NGO 
development, and electoral support. Due to the oppression during Meciarism, the 
Slovak NGOs know how to operate in oppressive environments, which gives them an 
advantage even within the V4 group.   
Still, the NGOs realise that the context of the Slovak and Tunisian transformations 
differ politically, culturally, and historically and therefore, the NGOs may lack 
necessary knowledge to tackle issues like the role of religion in a state or tribal 
conflicts. However, the Slovak organisations often see these differences as 
enriching, as they illustrate the recipients the variety of steps and models to choose 
from, which helps form beneficiaries’ opinions. Still, the biggest problem could be that 
many ‘lessons learnt’ during the Slovak transformation may not be of a practical use 
in Tunisia, as the Slovak democratisation was strongly influenced by the incentives of 
the EU and NATO memberships.   
Theoretical implications 
 
The main problem encountered in this research has been insufficiency of academic 
resources dealing with democracy assistance of post-communist donors, or Slovakia 
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concretely, which would have allowed the research to compare its findings with 
similar studies.   
It has been found that Slovakia understands its loyalty to liberal democratic values as 
a way of anchoring its Western and European identity and therefore it does not try to 
challenge the dominant model of democracy promotion. This may be understood as 
a confirmation of social-constructivist theory assuming that country’s behaviour 
towards other actors is driven by its identity construction based on the hypothesis 
that “how you are perceived by other is of a crucial importance for the general 
understanding of who you are” (Jonavicius, 2008, pg. 2). 
Further, the thematical analysis has produced themes or patterns, all of which are 
related to one of Petrova’s (2012a) two most influential factors impacting democracy 
assistance strategies of single countries, which are a) domestic values and 
experience of donors and b) recipients’ needs. The distinctive national approach of 
the Slovak NGOs also supports Petrova’s (2012a) claim that donors’ approaches 
depend on their domestic understanding of successes and failures of democratic 
development. Also, Slovak NGOs’ focus on civil society development and electoral 
support confirms Burnell’s (2011) finding that democracy assistance projects are 
most likely to concentrate on these two aspects of country’s democratisation.  
It has also been found that the external factor of democracy assistance may play a 
significant role in country’s democratic transformation, as stated by Huntington 
(1991). Although the activities of the external actors themselves will not secure the 
existence of a democratic rule in Tunisia, they can play a significant role at rooting 
the positive changes gained so far. However, there exist problems with the way in 
which democracy assistors operate, such as one-size-fits-all, or institution-centric 
approaches, as well as problems related to their global role and perception, which 
often cause mistrust. These issues were also mentioned in the writings of Burnell 
(2011, 2013), Hobson (2009), and McGlinchy (2011).  
Recommendations 
 
Following from the based data, it may be suggested that for the Slovak NGOs to use 
their potential most effectively, they should narrow down their priority sectors or their 
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aims and objectives should be formulated more specifically. Furthermore, the focus 
should be placed more or exclusively on direct transition experience transfer rather 
than financing. To maximise the value of the Slovak NGOs operations, their projects 
should be long-term. Although long-term projects are dependent on finances, which 
are at the moment after the financial crisis problematic, they could be reallocated 
from projects, which show low efficiency. Such are, for instance, scholarships (about 
two million euro every year) granted to students from developing countries studying 
in Slovakia, which do not bind the students to come home and therefore their positive 
effect on development is questionable.   
Due to the practical nonexistence of research focusing on the Slovak democracy 
assistance carried out at the nongovernmental level, it is recommended that further 
research is undertaken in this area. The future research could not only focus on 
Slovakia, but could also examine democracy assistance of other post-communist 
donors, for instance V4 countries, which would allow determining differences 
between them and shed more light on how differences in domestic democratic 
development reflect in donors’ democracy assistance strategies. Also, an evaluation 
of the effectiveness of the Slovak projects could be conducted after a period of three 
years from the start of the Slovak engagement in Tunisian democratisation process, 
July, which is ascertained as a ‘reflection period’.   
Finally, it may be concluded that the Slovak very concrete, practical and recent 
‘lessons learnt’ on how to defeat authoritarians, i. e. democratic breakthrough, and 
best practices on how to achieve reform objectives, i. e. consolidation, provide the 
Slovak NGOs with a comparative advantage within the donor community and 
increases its credibility not only as a donor but also as an international partner and so 
positions it well to contribute to Tunisia’s democratisation by sharing Slovakia’s 
transformational experience.  
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Appendices	
Appendix A: Information Sheet 
 
*This is a translation of the Slovak version, which will be used to contact the potential 
interviewees.  
 
 
 
Sharing the Slovak Transformational Experience: How Can Slovak NGOs 
Contribute to Democratisation of Tunisia? 
 
INFORMATION SHEET 
 
As you are being invited to participate in the research, it is essential that you 
understand what the study is about and what it will involve. Please read the 
information provided in the sheet carefully and do not hesitate to contact me should 
you require any more information.  
What is the study about? 
The aim of this study is to assess Slovak ability to provide Tunisia with a high level of 
expertise in terms of development aid in the field of building of democratic 
institutions. To do that, it will analyse the Slovak democratization process, assess the 
development aid provided to Balkan countries and based on parallels and differences 
between the Czecho-Slovak Velvet Revolution and Arabian Spring, will try to assess 
Slovak ability to provide expertise in a different environment.  
Why have I been approached? 
91 
 
You have been requested to take part in the study due to your knowledge in area of 
the Slovak foreign policy and your experience in the field of the Slovak development 
aid. This means that your expertise and opinions on the subject will provide a 
valuable insight into the problem. 
Do I have to take part? 
It is completely up to your own decision if you decide to take part in the study. If you 
do you will be requested to sign a consent form and will also be free to withdraw from 
the study anytime. 
What will I need to do? 
If you decide to participate in the study you will be asked to take part in an interview 
either personally, over Skype or over the telephone. You will be asked to discuss 
your carrier background and your role at the development project you have engaged 
in. Then, it will bring in questions regarding the process of Slovak democratization 
and your opinion on what lessons were learnt from it, how Slovakia can use this 
knowledge to provide a high level of expertise in the area of building of democratic 
institutions, your opinion on the previous Slovak experience in Balkan and Slovakia’s 
ability to adapt the knowledge and use it in a different environment, Tunisia. The 
interview will take less than hour and will be arranged so that any inconvenience to 
you is minimised. The interview will only be recorded with your permission.  
Will my identity be disclosed? 
For the purposes of this study, you are guaranteed anonymity. Your name will be 
changed and all the information provided will remain confidential.  
What will happen to the information? 
All the information provided will be kept secure and confidential. Any identifying 
information will be changed.   
Who can I contact for further information? 
Should you have any questions or require any further information about the study, do 
not hesitate to contact me to discuss any concerns. Please, find my contact details 
enclosed below. 
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Ivana Ulicna 
Post-Graduate Researcher 
University of Huddersfield 
Human and Health Sciences Research Building 
HD1 3DH 
 
E-mail: u1172005@hud.ac.uk 
Mobile: 0044 (0)7530 726 546 
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Appendix B: Interview Guide 
 
*This is a translation of the Slovak version, which will be used to contact the potential 
interviewees. 
 
 
 
Interview guide  
 
Title of Research Project: Sharing the Slovak Transformational Experience: 
How Can Slovak NGOs Contribute to Democratisation of Tunisia?  
 
 
Where do you work and what is your role in the organisation?  
How long have you been working there for? 
What was your role in the development project in Tunisia? 
What exactly was the project about and what aim was it trying to achieve?  
What tools of development aid were used to achieve that aim?  
Has Slovakia in your opinion completed its journey toward becoming a democratic 
state?  
What has been the impact of Slovakia’s aid and projects in Tunisia? 
What would you consider an added value of Slovak democracy assistance compared 
with other donors, especially major donors like the US or the EU?  
Do Slovak NGOs have something different to offer than NGOs based elsewhere?  
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How would you assess the Slovak development aid in Tunisia so far? How can it be 
improved? 
 
 
 
 
